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ABSTRACT 
EMTALA—the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act requiring hospital emergency departments to screen 
and stabilize emergency patients, regardless of ability to pay— 
has played a pivotal and peculiar role in American health care, 
as the only assured access to care for millions of people. 
Curiously, although EMTALA imposes enormous costs on 
hospitals, neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit courts have 
addressed its constitutionality. This Article argues that, 
particularly in the paradigm case of an indigent patient at a 
for-profit hospital, EMTALA violates the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause: the government takes property for public use 
without just compensation. 
All the elements of a taking are readily established: 
property, taking, and public use. 
Here, the property is not the hospital as such—this is not a 
case of land use regulation. Rather, the hospital is the “person” 
from whom property is taken, including: [1] personal property 
such as costly pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and paid staff 
time; and [2] physical invasion of spaces such as the emergency 
room, operating suites, and intensive care beds. 
Such destruction or transfer of personal property and 
invasion of physical spaces constitute per se takings. Regulatory 
takings analysis, ordinarily invoked for regulating real 
property, is inapplicable. 
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These takings’ public use is to ensure immediate emergency 
care, regardless of ability to pay. All three elements of a taking 
are thus satisfied. 
As this Article further argues, EMTALA’s broad economic 
coercion of hospitals cannot be justified as simply a condition of 
participation in Medicare. 
In the end, the problem is not that EMTALA mandates 
takings, but rather that it fails to provide adequately for just 
compensation. For-profit hospitals often receive no 
compensation whatever. Even not-for-profit hospitals can 
quickly cross the threshold from “compensated” (e.g., via tax 
exemption) into uncompensated care. Where compensation is 
insufficient, EMTALA’s takings are unconstitutional. 
The substantial constitutional impairment of EMTALA 
could trigger an interesting predicament. Historically, EMTALA 
has been a “fig leaf” obscuring the nation’s less-than-universal 
access to care. After all, the uninsured can always go to the 
emergency room. Going forward, EMTALA may be an “enabler,” 
encouraging healthy people to forego insurance until they 
become ill. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) permits anyone, even 
those with preexisting conditions, to buy insurance at the same 
cost as anyone else and, although it mandates that everyone be 
insured, the “tax” for noncompliance is modest and not strongly 
enforceable. Refusal to buy insurance until after one is ill may 
thus be attractive because, after all, the emergency room cannot 
demand advance assurance of payment. 
If the cost of insurance thereby spirals out of control 
because too few healthy people buy it, the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause could actually salvage the ACA’s mandate. 
Although this Article neither endorses nor disparages the idea, 
the individual mandate could be re-cast as a constitutionally 
proper act of eminent domain: the “property” being taken is the 
citizen’s money; the “just compensation” is a health insurance 
policy; and the “public use” is to save private health insurance 
as Congress’ chosen avenue for broadening access to care. 
Perhaps most interestingly, the mandate as an exercise of 
eminent domain need not satisfy the Commerce Clause. Per a 
long line of Supreme Court rulings, acts of eminent domain 
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I. OVERVIEW 
The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA), which requires hospitals with emergency facilities 
to screen and stabilize patients with emergency conditions, has 
been on the books for over a quarter century.1 It seems 
remarkable that the constitutionality of this law, which often 
requires hospitals to provide costly care with little or no 
compensation, has never been evaluated by the Supreme 
Court2 or any of the circuit courts.3 As this Article will show, 
such a challenge is overdue. EMTALA imposes takings, and as 
it lacks any provision for compensation, is unconstitutional 
every time the hospital’s services are uncompensated or 
undercompensated. 
In 1986 Congress enacted EMTALA to ensure that, when 
someone comes to a hospital’s emergency department (ED), the 
hospital will at least screen that person for emergency 
conditions4 and stabilize any such condition5 before transfer to 
another hospital or facility.6 The days precipitating EMTALA 
allegedly exhibited a pattern in which more profitable hospitals 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 2. The lone Supreme Court case regarding EMTALA is Roberts v. Galen 
of Virginia, Inc., 525 U.S. 249 (1999), in which the Court found that a plaintiff 
bringing an action alleging a failure to screen and/or stabilize need not prove 
that the hospital acted with an improper motive. Id. at 253. 
 3. The Author’s extensive research has revealed no circuit court 
decisions evaluating the constitutionality of EMTALA. 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (“In the case of a hospital that has an 
emergency department, if an individual (whether or not eligible for benefits 
under this subchapter) comes to the emergency department and a request is 
made on the individual’s behalf for examination or treatment for a medical 
condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening 
examination . . . .”). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (requiring “such further medical 
examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical 
condition”); see also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)(1) (2012) (“In the case of a hospital 
that has an emergency department, if an individual (whether or not eligible 
for Medicare benefits and regardless of ability to pay) ‘comes to the emergency 
department’, as defined in paragraph (b) of this section, the hospital 
must . . . (ii) If an emergency medical condition is determined to exist, provide 
any necessary stabilizing treatment, as defined in paragraph (d) of this 
section, or an appropriate transfer as defined in paragraph (e) of this section. 
If the hospital admits the individual as an inpatient for further treatment, the 
hospital’s obligation under this section ends, as specified in paragraph (d)(2) of 
this section.”). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1). 
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were said to “dump” indigent patients—those who “failed the 
billfold biopsy”—onto public or charity hospitals.7 This “anti-
dumping” statute, which binds all hospitals having a Medicare 
contract,8 was hailed as a major step toward broadening access 
to care in a nation that did not otherwise ensure universal 
coverage.9 The statute provides no compensation to hospitals 
for this care,10 and forbids hospitals to condition their provision 
of emergency services on patients’ ability to pay.11 
EMTALA forbids transfer of a still-unstable patient to 
another hospital unless the latter has facilities the treating 
hospital lacks, or the patient properly consents.12 Moreover, 
                                                          
 7. See Nathan S. Richards, Note, Judicial Resolution of EMTALA 
Screening Claims at Summary Judgment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591, 591, 595 
n.16 (2012) (stating that uninsured and minority individuals are typically the 
patients being dumped, and citing a Cook County study noting an increase of 
“interhospital transfers of patients to public general hospitals”). But see David 
A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Imperfect/Future Shock, 8 
HEALTH MATRIX 29, 48–50 (1998) (casting doubt on the claim that the alleged 
“dumping” giving rise to the legislation was, in fact, as serious or widespread 
as advocates claimed). 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 42 C.F.R. § 489.24. 
 9. See Hyman, supra note 7, at 29–30 (citing the popularity and 
“overwhelmingly favorable” response to EMTALA and its goal of providing 
emergency care to those unable to pay). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (requiring hospitals to treat all emergency 
patients, but not providing hospitals compensation if patient cannot pay for 
the service). 
 11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h) (“A participating hospital may not delay 
provision of an appropriate medical screening examination required under 
subsection (a) . . . or further medical examination and treatment required 
under subsection (b) . . . in order to inquire about the individual’s method of 
payment or insurance status.”). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c); see also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d) (providing for 
necessary stabilizing treatment for emergency medical conditions); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 489.24(e)(1) (“If an individual at a hospital has an emergency medical 
condition that has not been stabilized (as defined in paragraph (b) of this 
section), the hospital may not transfer the individual unless—(i) The transfer 
is an appropriate transfer (within the meaning of paragraph (e)(2) of this 
section); and (ii)(A) The individual (or a legally responsible person acting on 
the individual’s behalf) requests the transfer, after being informed of the 
hospital’s obligations under this section and of the risk of transfer. The 
request must be in writing and indicate the reasons for the request as well as 
indicate that he or she is aware of the risks and benefits of the transfer; (B) A 
physician (within the meaning of section 1861(r)(1) of the Act) has signed a 
certification that, based upon the information available at the time of transfer, 
the medical benefits reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate 
medical treatment at another medical facility outweigh the increased risks to 
the individual or, in the case of a woman in labor, to the woman or the unborn 
child, from being transferred. The certification must contain a summary of the 
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hospitals with specialized capabilities such as a burn unit or 
neonatal intensive care are required to accept transfers of 
patients requiring such services, even if that hospital has no 
ED.13 It is not uncommon for EMTALA patients to require 
inpatient admission followed by lengthy, costly inpatient care.14 
Violations can trigger civil money penalties up to $50,00015 and 
civil actions by injured patients.16 
                                                          
risks and benefits upon which it is based; or (C) If a physician is not physically 
present in the emergency department at the time an individual is transferred, 
a qualified medical person (as determined by the hospital in its by-laws or 
rules and regulations) has signed a certification described in paragraph 
(e)(1)(ii)(B) of this section after a physician (as defined in section 1861(r)(1) of 
the Act) in consultation with the qualified medical person, agrees with the 
certification and subsequently countersigns the certification. The certification 
must contain a summary of the risks and benefits upon which it is based.”); id. 
§ 489.24(e)(2) (“A transfer to another medical facility will be appropriate only 
in those cases in which—(i) The transferring hospital provides medical 
treatment within its capacity that minimizes the risks to the individual’s 
health and, in the case of a woman in labor, the health of the unborn child; (ii) 
The receiving facility—(A) Has available space and qualified personnel for the 
treatment of the individual; and (B) Has agreed to accept transfer of the 
individual and to provide appropriate medical treatment; (iii) The transferring 
hospital sends to the receiving facility all medical records (or copies thereof) 
related to the emergency condition which the individual has presented that 
are available at the time of the transfer . . . ; and (iv) The transfer is effected 
through qualified personnel and transportation equipment, as required, 
including the use of necessary and medically appropriate life support 
measures during the transfer.”). 
 13. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(f) (“A participating hospital that has specialized 
capabilities or facilities (including, but not limited to, facilities such as burn 
units, shock-trauma units, neonatal intensive care units, or, (with respect to 
rural areas), regional referral centers which, for purposes of this subpart, 
mean hospitals meeting the requirements of referral centers found at §412.96 
of this chapter) may not refuse to accept from a referring hospital within the 
boundaries of the United States an appropriate transfer of an individual who 
requires such specialized capabilities or facilities if the receiving hospital has 
the capacity to treat the individual.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 251 (1999) 
(stating that a woman run over by a truck had been in-patient for six weeks 
and required considerable further care); In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 592, 598 
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that an anencephalic infant who had lacked major 
portions of the brain except for brain stem was to be readmitted, for intensive 
care if necessary, any time that respiratory distress or other emergent 
condition required it). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1). 
 16. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2). EMTALA does not, however, provide for a civil 
cause of action against physicians. See, e.g., Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 
62 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that “EMTALA does not allow 
private suits against physicians”); Burditt v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
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This Article will show that EMTALA is frequently 
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause.17 That is, the federal government takes hospitals’ 
property for public use and, whenever that happens without 
just compensation, it is an unconstitutional taking.18 The 
clearest case is the medically indigent patient at a for-profit 
hospital that pays a full load of taxes and has no residual Hill-
Burton obligations.19 Here there is no compensation 
                                                          
Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1373 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding a civil penalty imposed 
on a physician by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”). The Fifth Amendment has been 
extended to the states. Compare Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 
250–51 (1833) (holding that the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment does 
not apply to the states), with Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (holding that the Takings Clause applies to 
the states). The due process language of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
state governments from taking private property in the absence of just 
compensation. See id. at 241 (holding that “private property . . . taken for the 
State” without compensation violates due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska ex rel. Bd. of Transp., 164 U.S. 
403, 417 (1896) (“The taking by a State of the private property . . . without the 
owner’s consent, for the private use of another . . . is a violation of the 
fourteenth article of amendment of the constitution . . . .”). 
 18. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating the unconstitutionality of taking 
private property for public use in the absence of “just compensation”); 42 
C.F.R. § 489.24(b) (defining hospital property as encompassing the “entire 
main hospital campus”). 
 19. The Hospital Survey and Construction Act, also known as the “Hill-
Burton” Act, was an early effort at requiring hospitals to provide care for 
indigent patients. See Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act, ch. 
958, 60 Stat. 1040, 1043 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.                    
§§ 291–291m); 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“[T]he State plan 
shall provide for adequate hospital facilities for . . . persons unable to pay 
therefor.”); see also Richards, supra note 7, at 597–98 (stating that the Hill-
Burton Act, an earlier attempt to “ensure equal access to emergency care,” 
was a failure, lacking adequate provisions authorizing penalties for non-
compliance). In exchange for financial assistance toward hospital construction, 
the recipient hospital was obligated to provide a “reasonable” amount of 
charity care. See Hill-Burton Act, 60 Stat. at 1043 (“[T]here will be made 
available in each such hospital . . . a reasonable volume of hospital services to 
persons unable to pay therefor . . . .”); see also Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Schweiker, 
721 F.2d 170, 180 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding the compliance level of 10% of all 
federal assistance receive, adjusted for inflation, was a reasonable standard 
for the required “volume of services”). The Act’s limited enforcement 
provisions eventually were amended in 1979 to place clear obligations on 
hospitals via Title XVI of the Public Health Service Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–301 
(2006 & Supp. V 2011). Funding under the Act ceased in 1997 and, at present, 
only around 170 hospitals in the United States still have Hill-Burton 
obligations. Hill-Burton Free and Reduced-Cost Health Care, HEALTH 
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whatsoever.20 While more nuanced issues surround public and 
not-for-profit private hospitals, just compensation often fails 
there as well. 
The analysis below borrows its analytic steps from 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.21: 
[1] Is there a property interest; 
[2] Is there a taking of property; 
[3] If there is a taking, is it for public use; and 
[4] If there is a taking of property for public use, is there just 
compensation.22 
Accordingly, Part II discusses property. Although typical 
takings cases feature real estate in eminent domain 
condemnations, in fact “property” can also encompass anything 
from contract rights, to interest money, to intellectual property, 
and tangible personal property.23 
In EMTALA cases the property is not the hospital-as-a-
whole.24 Rather, two kinds of property are involved: [1] 
personal property such as drugs, bandages, and medical 
devices; and [2] transient invasions of real property, specifically 
into emergency room (ER) spaces, operating rooms (ORs), 
intensive care unit (ICU) beds, and regular inpatient rooms—
essentially the “rental value” of these spaces.25 Correctly 
identifying the kinds of property at stake permits a correct 
description of the type of taking that then occurs. 
With a brief foray into the historical evolution of takings 
jurisprudence, Part III distinguishes per se takings from 
regulatory takings. Per se takings are characterized by either 
complete destruction of the property’s value, or alternatively a 
physical invasion or occupation of property.26 These are takings 
no matter how small the intrusion, and they need not be 
                                                          
RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/gethealthcare/
affordable/hillburton/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
 20. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a) (providing that hospitals with an ED must 
provide an appropriate screening and stabilizing treatment to patients that 
seek treatment at the ED regardless of the patient’s ability to pay); Richards, 
supra note 7, at 592 n.3 (explaining that hospitals receiving Medicare funds, 
which includes essentially every hospital, are bound by EMTALA). 
 21. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 22. See id. at 1000–01. 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
 26. See infra Part III.A. 
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permanent.27 Regulatory takings, in contrast, arise in the 
absence of any such physical invasion or destruction.28 The 
concept recognizes that at some point a government regulation 
restricting the use of one’s property can become so onerous it is 
tantamount to a taking.29 Regulatory takings lack any set 
formula, but rather require a somewhat ad-hoc, fact-intensive 
inquiry.30 As we will see, EMTALA takings are per se takings, 
and it is erroneous to invoke regulatory takings analyses.31 
Part IV shows that EMTALA’s legitimate public use is to 
ensure essential medical care at a time people are most 
vulnerable,32 and that takings transferring property from one 
private party to another can still satisfy the “public use” 
criterion.33 
Collectively, Parts II, III and IV conclude that EMTALA 
enforcement commits takings under the Fifth Amendment.34 
Still, there is nothing inherently wrong with eminent domain. 
Indeed the Takings Clause presupposes that such acts can be 
constitutionally permissible.35 However, they must be 
accompanied by just compensation.36 
Part V thus addresses compensation, first by addressing 
the most common argument that would favor EMTALA’s 
constitutionality. The “voluntariness” argument proposes that 
EMTALA is simply a Medicare condition of participation (CoP), 
i.e., that EMTALA cannot be problematic because hospitals are 
not forced to accept Medicare in the first place.37 “Congress 
may attach appropriate conditions to federal taxing and 
spending programs to preserve its control over the use of 
federal funds.”38 On this argument, if EMTALA imposes a 
taking, the just compensation is the benefit of earning money 
                                                          
 27. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 28. See infra Part III.A. 
 29. See infra Part III.A. 
 30. See infra Part III.A. 
 31. See infra Part III. 
 32. See infra Part IV. 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
 34. See infra Part V. 
 35. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See infra Part V.A. 
 38. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 
(2012). 
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by participating in Medicare.39 If hospitals do not want 
EMTALA obligations, they can simply withdraw from the 
program.40 
This reasoning fails. Although the federal government can 
place conditions on its funds, financial inducement that 
becomes coercive becomes an unconstitutional overreaching of 
federal powers.41 For most hospitals, Medicare represents such 
a huge proportion of revenue that Medicare’s EMTALA CoP 
presents an unacceptable “economic dragooning,” a “gun to the 
head”42 choice: either provide potentially vast amounts of 
uncompensated care, or lose an enormous portion of its overall 
budget via the loss of all Medicare patients.43 
Once it is established that the federal government must 
actually pay for EMTALA services, Part V then discusses just 
compensation in two settings: patients’ payments; and existing 
federal payments as applied to for-profit hospitals, not-for-
profit hospitals, and public hospitals. In the paradigmatic case 
of medically indigent patients at for-profit hospitals with no 
Hill-Burton obligations, often there is no compensation 
whatsoever—a plain violation of the Takings Clause.44 The 
other settings require a more nuanced analysis, but arguably 
involve a broad spectrum of inadequately compensated takings 
in plain violation of the Fifth Amendment.45 
Part VI empowers the foregoing reasoning by discussing 
the confused state of jurisprudence in a neighboring bit of case 
law: state statutes that, like EMTALA, require hospitals to 
provide uncompensated care.46 These courts mistakenly 
conceive of the “property” in terms real estate—applying a 
regulatory takings analysis to inquire whether the hospital-as-
a-whole is heavily damaged by the statute—rather than 
focusing on the correct sorts of property, namely, personal 
                                                          
 39. See infra Part V.A. 
 40. See infra Part V.A. 
 41. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (referring to the Affordable Care Act’s then-
requirement that states broaden their Medicaid programs significantly or lose 
all federal Medicaid funding); see infra Part V.A. 
 42. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (“In this case, the financial ‘inducement’ 
Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is 
a gun to the head.”). 
 43. See infra Part V. 
 44. See infra Part V.C.1. 
 45. See infra Part V.C. 
 46. See infra Part VI. 
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property and physical invasions of hospital spaces.47 As a 
result, these courts mistakenly undertake a regulatory rather 
than per se takings analysis.48 
Finally, Part VII explores one particular public policy 
implication of overturning or substantially limiting EMTALA, 
and adds a twist. Because EMTALA assures that if you’re sick 
or injured you can always go to the ER,49 EMTALA has 
historically served as something of a “fig leaf” covering the 
nation’s failure to ensure universal access to health care.50 
Going forward, EMTALA is likely to serve as an “enabler” 
encouraging citizens to refrain from buying health insurance. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(PPACA, or ACA)51 mandates that every citizen and legal 
resident be insured,52 yet several factors may predictably deter 
sufficiently broad compliance: [a] the cost of buying insurance 
is considerably greater than the penalty (“tax”) for not 
purchasing it;53 [b] those who wait until after they are ill or 
injured can still buy the same insurance for the same price as 
anybody else;54 and [c] in the interim, they can always count on 
the ER.55 In this way EMTALA may encourage people to forego 
health insurance.56 This could drive the cost of insurance 
unacceptably high, thereby encouraging still more people to 
forego that now-higher cost in favor of relying on the 
emergency room.57 An ACA “mandate” that has no teeth could 
thus, with EMTALA’s help, create something of a death-spiral 
for affordable care.58 
                                                          
 47. See infra Part VI. 
 48. See infra Part VI. 
 49. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 50. See infra Part VII.A. 
 51. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). For a detailed description of the ACA, see infra Part VII.B. 
 52. See infra Part VII.B. 
 53. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2595–96 (2012) (“[F]or most Americans the amount due will be far less than 
the price of insurance, and, by statute, it can never be more.”). 
 54. See id. at 2585 (discussing the ACA’s provisions for “community-
rating” and “guaranteed-issue”). 
 55. See infra Part VII.B. 
 56. See infra Part VII.B. 
 57. See infra Part VII.B. 
 58. See infra Part VII.B. 
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If this ominous scenario comes to pass, the Fifth 
Amendment could actually provide an interesting twist to 
salvage the ACA’s mandate. Although this Article neither 
endorses nor opposes the idea, the takings analysis offered here 
could reconfigure the ACA’s mandate under the principles of 
eminent domain as a proper, fully constitutional taking.59 The 
“property” to be taken is the person’s money, the “just 
compensation” is a health insurance plan, and the proffered 
“public use” would be to keep the current private insurance-
based health care system viable.60 
Even more interestingly, casting the mandate as a classic 
case of eminent domain need not pass constitutional muster 
under either the Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending 
Clause.61 The Supreme Court has been clear that government 
acts of eminent domain need only satisfy a rational basis test.62 
Thus, to keep the ACA’s health care system viable, the 
mandate could, itself, be quite readily enforced as a 
constitutionally proper taking. For better or worse, the idea 
could expand the public debate in interesting directions. 
II. PROPERTY 
Per the Fifth Amendment: “[N]or shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”63 As 
emphasized by the Supreme Court over half a century ago, 
“[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall 
not be taken for a public use without just compensation was 
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.”64 
                                                          
 59. See infra Part VII.C. 
 60. See infra Part VII.C. 
 61. See infra Part VII.C. 
 62. See infra Part VII.C. 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 64. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Otherwise stated: 
“[The] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public 
property without compensation . . . . This is the very kind of thing that the 
Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.” Webb’s 
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980); see also 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (citing Armstrong, 364 
U.S. at 49); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001) (citing 
Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998) 
(plurality opinion) (citing Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49); First English 
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A. CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY 
The first challenge is to define “property.” The most 
familiar takings cases, and indeed the bulk of applicable 
jurisprudence, concern real property.65 If a state needs to build 
a new road through Farmer Brown’s land, the Fifth 
Amendment permits the state to condemn the land, pay Brown, 
and build the road.66 
Still, takings jurisprudence addresses myriad other forms 
of property. Clearly, money is property.67 Financial interest on 
money has counted as property for Fifth Amendment purposes, 
such as the interest on a lawyer’s trust account.68 Tangible 
property is likewise encompassed, including fixtures and 
equipment located on real property,69 presidential papers made 
                                                          
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 318–19 (1987) (citing Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49); Connolly v. Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) (citing Armstrong, 364 U.S. 
at 49); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (explaining 
that Takings Clause analysis requires an examination of whether the taking 
forces an individual to “bear public burdens” that “should be borne” by all); 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24, 148 (1978) 
(citing Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49) (stating that the Fifth Amendment prevents 
an individual from taking on more than his or her share of government 
burdens). 
 65. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (“The paradigmatic taking requiring just 
compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of 
private property.”). 
 66. The Fifth Amendment’s provisions regarding government takings are 
extended to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Pruneyard, 
447 U.S. at 84 (“A State is, of course, bound by the Just Compensation Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment . . . .”); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 122 (stating that a 
Taking “within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment” is applicable to the 
states “through the Fourteenth Amendment”); Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 125 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
prohibits the taking of private property . . . without just compensation.”). 
 67. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 162 (“The principal sum 
deposited in the registry of the court plainly was private property . . . .”). 
 68. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003); Phillips v. 
Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998); see also Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 162 (finding interest on an escrow account to be 
deemed property for Fifth Amendment purposes). 
 69. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 383–84 (1945). 
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while in office,70 the feathers and body parts of eagles,71 and 
alcoholic beverages.72 
Intangible property is also included. Contract rights such 
as a materialman’s lien,73 tenure in the academic setting,74 
lease and rental rights,75 and other kinds of contract rights76 all 
are property for Takings Clause purposes.77 Intellectual 
property such as trade secrets likewise qualifies.78 
                                                          
 70. Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 71. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 58 (1979). 
 72. Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 563 (1924); Jacob Ruppert, 
Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 274–75 (1920). 
 73. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 46–48 (1960) (“The result of 
this [series of events] was a destruction of all petitioners’ property rights 
under their liens, although, as we have pointed out, the liens were valid and 
had compensable value . . . . We hold that there was a taking of these liens for 
which just compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 74. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1972); 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601–03 (1972). 
 75. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 373, 377–78 
(1945). 
 76. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (holding that 
valid contracts for war risk insurance are property within the meaning of the 
Takings Clause). 
 77. Other kinds of property rights have also been identified, such as a 
physician’s right to practice medicine. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 
121–22 (1889); Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 334 (1st Cir. 1992); Keney v. 
Derbyshire, 718 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir. 1983); see also Barry v. Barchi, 443 
U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (occupational license is property for due process purposes); 
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (driver’s license is property); Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (welfare payments regarded as 
property). 
 78. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002–04 (1984). 
Trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more tangible forms 
of property. A trade secret is assignable . . . . A trade secret can form 
the res of a trust, Restatement (Second) of Trusts . . . and it passes to 
a trustee in bankruptcy . . . . This general perception of trade secrets 
as property is consonant with a notion of “property” that extends 
beyond land and tangible goods and includes the products of an 
individual’s “labour and invention.” . . . Although this Court never has 
squarely addressed the question whether a person can have a 
property interest in a trade secret, which is admittedly intangible, the 
Court has found other kinds of intangible interests to be property for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause . . . . We therefore 
hold that to the extent that Monsanto has an interest in its health, 
safety, and environmental data cognizable as a trade-secret property 
right under Missouri law, that property right is protected by the 
Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 32–33 
(1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“Therefore, it is clear that the tobacco companies 
have a property interest in their trade secrets . . . .”). Somewhat in between 
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Basic theories of property permeate these analyses.79 
Particularly central is the right to exclude others, “one of the 
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.”80 Regarding intellectual property 
such as a trade secret, for instance, “the right to exclude others 
is central to the very definition of the property interest. Once 
the data that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, 
or others are allowed to use those data, the holder of the trade 
secret has lost his property interest in the data.”81 
                                                          
real property and intangible property, the Supreme Court has held that the 
air space above one’s land has property status. United States v. Causby, 328 
U.S. 256, 266 (1946). Very low-altitude flights originating in a nearby military 
airfield caused such great noise that the plaintiffs’ land was rendered 
completely useless as a chicken farm. Id. at 261. The Court held that although 
flights over private land are not inherently a taking, they can be if “they are so 
low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the 
enjoyment and use of the land.” Id. at 266. 
The fact that [the landowner] does not occupy it in a physical sense—
by the erection of buildings and the like—is not material. As we have 
said, the flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch 
it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more 
conventional entry upon it. 
Id. at 264. 
 79. See General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 377–78 (“It is conceivable that 
[the term ‘property’ in the Takings Clause] was used in its vulgar and 
untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen 
exercises rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it may have been 
employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in 
the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and 
dispose of it. In point of fact, the construction given the phrase has been the 
latter.” (citation omitted)); see also Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly 
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more 
than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to 
protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that 
must not be arbitrarily undermined.”). 
 80. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see id. at 
179–80 (“In this case, we hold that the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to 
be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of 
interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.” (citation 
omitted)); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987) 
(quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176); Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at 1011; 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Cable Television Corp, 458 U.S. 419, 433 
(1982); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) (“It is true 
that one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to 
exclude others.” (citing Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176)). 
 81. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at 1011 (citation omitted); see also Loretto, 458 
U.S. at 435 (“Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the 
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B. EMTALA PROPERTY ANALYSIS 
In EMTALA cases, the property in question is not the 
hospital as a piece of land with buildings on it. Rather, the 
hospital as a business entity is the (corporate) “person” whose 
property is at stake. Hospitals rendering care under EMTALA 
use two kinds of property—personal and real.82 First, EMTALA 
patients consume large quantities of personal property such as 
pharmaceuticals, devices and bandages,83 and can include 
depreciation of equipment and fixtures.84 Paid labor can also be 
included.85 Discrete labor services such as physical therapy 
count if billed separately;86 an hour of professional service is 
just as much consumed as a bandage. 
Second, on the real property side, EMTALA patients 
transiently occupy physical spaces—a cubicle in the ER, an 
inpatient room, an ICU bed, an OR suite.87 
                                                          
rights ‘to possess, use and dispose of it.’ To the extent that the government 
permanently occupies physical property, it effectively destroys each of these 
rights. First, the owner has no right to possess the occupied space himself, and 
also has no power to exclude the occupier from possession and use of the 
space. The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most 
treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”); see also Philip 
Morris, 312 F.3d 24, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (discussing how there is a 
property interest in a trade secret); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 
156, 170 (1998) (citing General Motors, 323 U.S. at 378) (“[P]roperty is more 
than economic value . . . it also consists of ‘the group of rights which the so-
called owner exercises in his dominion of the physical thing,’ such ‘as the right 
to possess, use and dispose of it . . . .’”). 
 82. See Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 126–27 (1st Cir. 
2009) (discussing types of property consumed by emergency room patients). 
 83. See, e.g., id at 127. 
 84. See General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 383–84. 
 85. See Franklin Mem’l Hosp., 575 F.3d at 127 (discussing labor costs of 
emergency room care). 
 86. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE 
CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL: CHAPTER 12—PHYSICIANS/NONPHYSICIAN 
PRACTITIONERS (2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/clm104c12.pdf (describing billing 
procedures for physical and respiratory therapy under Medicare). 
 87. See Franklin Mem’l Hosp., 575 F.3d at 127 (discussing the 
approximate cost of “room and board services” for a patient). Here, labor costs 
are typically included rather than billed separately. The cost of nursing care is 
built into the daily price of an ICU bed, and the cost of cleaning up the OR 
suite after a surgery is built into the cost for using that OR—just as the cost of 
maid service and furnace maintenance are built into the cost of a night’s stay 
at a hotel. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE 
CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL: CHAPTER 1—GENERAL BILLING REQUIREMENTS 
(2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/
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Hospitals’ costs in providing both kinds of property to these 
patients can be enormous. Franklin Memorial Hospital in 
Maine, for instance, determined that on average each 
uncompensated inpatient stay (under a Maine law broader 
than EMTALA)88 required “approximately $1,200 in medical 
goods, such as medical and surgical supplies, pharmacy drugs, 
anesthesia gases, and intravenous therapy supplies, about 
$1,700 in room and board services, and . . . about $1,800 for 
doctors, nurses, and other staff to provide care to the client.”89 
For those without a calculator handy the total is $4700. 
Some EMTALA patients, of course, generate vastly higher 
costs.90 In Matter of Baby K, the mother of an anencephalic91 
infant insisted that the hospital use whatever means 
necessary, including ventilator support in the ICU for as long 
as necessary, to keep her child alive as long as possible.92 After 
six months the hospital filed suit “to resolve the issue of 
whether it is obligated to provide emergency medical treatment 
to Baby K that it deems medically and ethically 
inappropriate.”93 
The Fourth Circuit ruled that if Baby K appeared in the 
ED in respiratory distress—a medical emergency—EMTALA 
would require the hospital to treat her as long as necessary to 
stabilize her condition and prevent material deterioration.94 
“Baby K spent many months in the pediatric intensive care 
unit at a minimum cost of $1,450 per day. Nursing home costs 
                                                          
Manuals/Downloads/clm104c01.pdf (describing billing procedures for inpatient 
hospital stays under Medicare). 
 88. See Franklin Mem’l Hosp., 575 F.3d at 123–24 (describing a Maine 
statute under which hospitals were required to provide free medical care to 
low income patients without adequate compensation). 
 89. Id. at 127 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 592–93 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing 
all the treatment and constant care Baby K received). 
 91. See id. at 592–93, 599 (explaining anencephaly as a condition in which 
the entire brain and a significant portion of the cranium, except for the brain 
stem, are missing from a newborn; because the person has no cerebrum, he or 
she is permanently unconscious). 
 92. Id. at 592–93. 
 93. Id. at 593. The hospital argued on grounds of futility, since no 
treatment could ever produce consciousness or cognitive function. Id. at 597. 
 94. Id. at 594. The court reasoned that if society wishes to limit this sort 
of aggressive treatment for conditions such as anencephaly, that is for the 
legislature, not the judiciary, to address. See id. at 597–98. 
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were estimated at over $100 per day.”95 She survived nearly 
two and a half years.96 Baby K’s care was covered by private 
insurance and Medicaid97 but, had she been uninsured, 
EMTALA would have mandated the full panoply of care for no 
compensation whatsoever.98 
Admittedly, EMTALA obligations technically are concluded 
if the hospital admits the person as an inpatient.99 However, 
the costs generated thereafter are still fundamentally 
attributable to EMTALA. If it were possible for the hospital 
simply to transfer a costly indigent patient to a public hospital, 
as they could pre-EMTALA, then the hospital would not be 
required to absorb the ongoing high costs of an inherently 
unstable patient.100 
                                                          
 95. Tricia L. Romesberg, Futile Care and the Neonate: In The Matter of 
Baby K, 3 ADVANCES NEONATAL CARE 213, 214 (2003) (citations omitted). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 99. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2)(i) (2012) (“If a hospital has screened an 
individual under paragraph (a) of this section and found the individual to have 
an emergency medical condition, and admits that individual as an inpatient in 
good faith in order to stabilize the emergency medical condition, the hospital 
has satisfied its special responsibilities under this section with respect to that 
individual.”); see also Lopez v. Contra Costa Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. C 12-03726 
LB, 2013 WL 120166, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013) (“[I]f the hospital performs 
the screening of the emergency medical treatment and admits the individual 
as an inpatient, either for further treatment or in good faith in order to 
stabilize the emergency medical condition, then the hospital has satisfied its 
responsibilities with respect to the individual.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 100. E.g., Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 610 (Ariz. 
1984) (describing an Arizona statute that allowed private hospitals to seek 
reimbursement from public funds for providing emergency treatment to 
indigent patients). In Baby K the district court opined that: 
The Hospital would also have an obligation to continue to provide 
stabilizing medical treatment to Baby K even if she were admitted to 
the pediatric intensive care unit or other unit of the Hospital and to 
provide the treatment until she could be transferred back to the 
Nursing Home or to another facility willing to accept her. 
In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 (E.D. Va. 1993). “[The] rationale behind 
[the] ‘anti-dumping statute is not based upon the door of the hospital through 
which a patient enters, but rather upon the notion of proper medical care for 
those persons suffering medical emergencies, whenever such emergencies 
occur at a participating hospital.’” Id. (quoting McIntyre v. Schick, 795 F. 
Supp. 777, 781 (E.D. Va. 1992)). The Fourth Circuit affirmed, expressly on the 
basis of EMTALA. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 1994). 
[S]tabilization of her condition requires the Hospital to provide 
respiratory support through the use of a respirator or other means 
necessary to ensure adequate ventilation. In sum, a straightforward 
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EMTALA thus can place enormous costs on hospitals. 
Hospitals with special facilities such as newborn intensive care 
or burn units, for instance, are required to accept transfers of 
patients needing such facilities, even if such a hospital has no 
ED.101 Additionally, whole groups of persons can present 
significant financial challenges under EMTALA. Estimates 
suggest that nearly eleven million undocumented immigrants 
live in the United States,102 many of whom rely on free care—
much of which originates in the ER.103 
                                                          
application of the statute obligates the Hospital to provide respiratory 
support to Baby K when she arrives at the emergency department of 
the Hospital in respiratory distress and treatment is requested on her 
behalf. 
Id. at 594–95 (citations omitted); see also id. at 593 (noting the Hospital’s 
inability, once Baby K was an inpatient, to transfer her to another hospital 
with a pediatric intensive care unit, when all hospitals in the region refused to 
accept the patient). 
 101. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(f) (2012) (“A participating hospital that has 
specialized capabilities or facilities (including, but not limited to, facilities 
such as burn units, shock-trauma units, neonatal intensive care units, or, 
(with respect to rural areas) regional referral centers which, for purposes of 
this subpart, mean hospitals meeting the requirements of referral centers 
found at § 412.96 of this chapter) may not refuse to accept from a referring 
hospital within the boundaries of the United States an appropriate transfer of 
an individual who requires such specialized capabilities or facilities if the 
receiving hospital has the capacity to treat the individual.”). 
 102. Carrie Dann, By the Numbers: How America Tallies Its 11.1 Million 
Undocumented Immigrants, NBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2013, 4:43 AM), 
http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/11/17691515-by-the-numbers-
how-america-tallies-its-111-million-undocumented-immigrants?lite. 
 103. See Deborah Sontag, Immigrants Facing Deportation by U.S. 
Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/us/
03deport.html (discussing how, in some cases, hospitals incurring high 
ongoing costs have resorted to repatriating such immigrants and how one 
hospital, after caring for a severely injured undocumented immigrant, finally 
chartered a plane and sent the patient to a community hospital in his native 
Guatemala); Deborah Sontag, Jury Rules for Hospital that Deported Patient, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/us/
28deport.html (reporting that a Florida jury found the hospital not liable for 
its actions because it “did not act unreasonably” in repatriating the “severely 
brain-injured Guatemalan patient against the will of his guardian”); see also 
Alan Zarembo & Anna Gorman, Citizenship Often Determines Who Gets 
Medical Care, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/
printedition/front/la-me-dialysis29-2008oct29,0,2441127.story (discussing how 
North Carolina refused to provide some forms of treatment to an illegal 
immigrant); U.S. Hospitals Deport Undocumented Patients, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/2013/04/24/AP-
US-hospitals-deport-undocumented-patients (reporting that estimates suggest 
over 600 undocumented immigrants have been deported in the past five years, 
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Add next the U.S. citizens who have a very low income, but 
who do not currently qualify for Medicaid.104 In 2011, U.S. 
hospitals absorbed over $40 billion in uncompensated care, 
according to the American Hospital Association.105 The number 
of people who cannot pay could soon grow substantially. 
Originally the ACA required states to expand their Medicaid 
coverage from a limited range of individuals at or below 100% 
of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL), to all non-Medicare 
individuals up to 133% of the FPL—on pain of losing all 
Medicaid funding.106 This was the only part struck down in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 
(NFIB): although the federal government can permissibly 
attach conditions to its disbursements to states, withdrawing 
all Medicaid funding would be unduly coercive as a means to 
induce states to expand their programs.107 
                                                          
in what is being dubbed “medical repatriation”); U.S. Hospitals Repatriating 
Sick/Injured Undocumented Immigrants, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.upi.com/Health_News/2013/04/24/US-hospitals-repatriating-
sickinjured-undocumented-immigrants/UPI-21001366847321/ (reporting there 
have been “more than 800 cases of attempted or actual medical deportations 
in recent years”). 
 104. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2601 (2012) (“The current Medicaid program requires States to cover only 
certain discrete categories of needy individuals—pregnant women, children, 
needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled. There is no mandatory 
coverage for most childless adults, and the States typically do not offer any 
such coverage. The States also enjoy considerable flexibility with respect to 
the coverage levels for parents of needy families. On average States cover only 
those unemployed parents who make less than 37 percent of the federal 
poverty level, and only those employed parents who make less than 63 percent 
of the poverty line.” (citations omitted)). 
 105. Bruce Japsen, Unpaid Hospital Bills Rise to $41 Billion Annually, 
FORBES (Jan. 7, 2013, 9:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/
2013/01/07/unpaid-hospital-bills-rise-to-41-billion-annually/. 
 106. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582 (“States now cover adults with children 
only if their income is considerably lower, and do not cover childless adults at 
all.”); id. at 2601 (noting the list will include children, pregnant women, 
parents, and adults without dependent children who fall between 100% to 
133% of the FPL). To encourage states to embrace the Medicaid expansion, the 
ACA specifies that the federal government will pay 100% of the costs of 
expansion from 2014–2016, gradually dropping to 90% by 2020. Id. (“The 
Affordable Care Act provides that the Federal Government will pay 100 
percent of the costs of covering these newly eligible individuals through 2016. 
In the following years, the federal payment level gradually decreases, to a 
minimum of 90 percent.” (citation omitted)). 
 107. Id. at 2604. 
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The result is that states can choose not to participate in 
Medicaid expansion.108 At the same time, eligibility to receive 
subsidies in states’ insurance exchanges under the ACA now 
requires that one’s income be at least 100% of the FPL.109 As a 
result, beginning in 2014 in states declining to expand 
Medicaid, significant numbers of people will effectively be left 
without insurance coverage options—namely, those who are 
poor but not eligible for Medicaid.110 Their lone option will be 
the ER. 
Yet another group may increase the ranks of the 
uninsured. The ACA requires insurance plans to cover a fairly 
                                                          
 108. See Benjamin D. Sommers & Arnold M. Epstein, U.S. Governors and 
the Medicaid Expansion: No Quick Resolution in Sight, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
496, 498–99 (2013) (discussing wide variations between states regarding their 
willingness to expand Medicaid and the reasoning behind their decision-
making process following the NFIB decision). 
 109. Initially, eligibility to participate in state insurance exchanges began 
at 133% of the FPL because states were required to include all persons with 
lesser incomes in expanded Medicaid programs. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 
(“The Medicaid provisions of the Affordable Care Act, in contrast, require 
States to expand their Medicaid programs by 2014 to cover all individuals 
under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty 
line.”). At this point, however, subsidies to participate in state insurance 
exchanges begin at 100% of the FPL: 
The current Medicaid program requires States to cover only certain 
discrete categories of needy individuals—pregnant women, children, 
needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled. There is no 
mandatory coverage for most childless adults, and the States 
typically do not offer any such coverage. The States also enjoy 
considerable flexibility with respect to the coverage levels for parents 
of needy families. On average States cover only those unemployed 
parents who make less than 37 percent of the federal poverty level, 
and only those employed parents who make less than 63 percent of 
the poverty line. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 110. Sabrina Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, Millions of Poor Are Left 
Uncovered by Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/10/03/health/millions-of-poor-are-left-uncovered-by-health-
law.html?_r=0; see also Emily Wagster Pettus, Miss. Says No Thanks to 
Medicaid Expansion Dollars, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 18, 2012, 1:36 PM), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/miss-says-no-thanks-medicaid-expansion-dollars 
(reporting that Mississippi—one of the poorest states with a high level of 
Medicaid eligibility both currently and under an ACA expansion—has 
announced that it will decline the option of expanding Medicaid, which will 
leave substantial numbers of Mississippians with no access to health 
insurance); see also Reid Wilson, The Affordable Care Act Won’t Help These 5 
Million People, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/10/16/the-affordable-
care-act-wont-help-these-5-million-people/. 
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rich set of “essential health benefits.”111 Because this level of 
coverage is significantly greater than that provided by some 
pre-ACA insurance plans, subscribers to lesser policies must 
shift to a higher-benefit policy, typically at higher cost.112 Those 
who cannot afford the new premium, and who for whatever 
reason will not receive sufficient subsidy going forward, may 
well end up uninsured and likewise reliant on the ER. 
In sum, EMTALA requires hospitals to provide 
considerable personal property: pharmaceuticals, bandages, 
medical devices, laboratory tests, radiographs, enteral and 
parenteral nutrition, maintenance expenses and depreciation of 
(high-cost) equipment, and paid staff time. And so long as the 
EMTALA patient occupies a space—whether in the ED, the 
OR, the ICU, or a regular hospital room—he or she consumes 
the “rental value” of that space. 
All these are property. And central to what follows, the 
property in question is not the hospital-as-a-whole. Bricks, 
mortar, and dirt are not what is given to the patient. The next 
question is whether these EMTALA-mandated consumptions 
and invasions of property constitute takings. 
III. TAKING 
As we have seen, the identification of “property” for 
EMTALA analysis needs to be precise—bandages and beds, not 
bricks and mortar. Likewise for a “taking.” Admittedly, takings 
jurisprudence is not a model of clarity. Per the First Circuit, 
“the jurisprudence in this area is convoluted and subject to 
various interpretations.”113 Nevertheless, the jurisprudence 
                                                          
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (Supp. V 2011). 
 112. Carter Evans, Arrival of Obamacare Forcing Insurers to Drop 
Customers With Low Coverage, CBS NEWS.COM (Oct. 24, 2013, 7:15 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57609224/arrival-of-obamacare-
forcing-insurers-to-drop-customers-with-low-coverage/; see Anemona 
Hartocollis, With Affordable Care Act, Canceled Policies for New York 
Professionals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/
14/nyregion/with-affordable-care-act-canceled-policies-for-new-york-
professionals.html. 
 113. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc); 
see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (“[O]ur 
regulatory Takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified . . . .”). 
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applicable to EMTALA is plenty clear enough to resolve the key 
questions.114 
A. EVOLUTION OF TAKINGS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
Throughout the nation’s early history, the only recognized 
sort of taking was the classic case in which government 
completely appropriated the property.115 In 1922 that changed 
with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,116 when regulation of 
property began to fall within the ambit of takings. 
Beginning with Mahon, however, the Court recognized that 
government regulation of private property may, in some instances, 
be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation 
or ouster—and that such “regulatory takings” may be compensable 
under the Fifth Amendment. In Justice Holmes’ storied but cryptic 
formulation, “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”117 
Such “regulatory” takings pose a significant theoretical 
challenge, because the government does not take or destroy the 
property outright, but simply restricts its use.118 Human 
society involves considerable give-and-take. Surely the 
government cannot be expected to compensate a citizen for 
every small impact that merely “adjusts the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”119 
Accordingly, “not every destruction or injury to property by 
                                                          
 114. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (noting it is regulatory takings 
jurisprudence that particularly exhibits convolution and confusion, rather 
than the per se takings jurisprudence). 
 115. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) 
(summarizing Takings Clause jurisprudence). 
 116. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 117. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537–38 (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415); see also 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
323–25 (2002) (discussing the distinction between acquisitions of property and 
regulations that can be recognized as a taking). 
 118. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537–38. 
 119. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124; see also 
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (discussing how examining the adjustment of benefits 
and burdens is relevant to see if there has been a taking); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 
524 U.S. 498, 519 (1998) (plurality opinion); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017; Connolly 
v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986) (“This 
interference with the property rights . . . arises from a public program that 
adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good 
and, under our cases, does not constitute a taking requiring Government 
compensation.”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Cable Television Corp, 
458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
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governmental action has been held to be a ‘taking’ in the 
constitutional sense.”120 
Nevertheless, government regulation can sometimes be so 
intrusive that it becomes a taking requiring compensation: “[A] 
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not 
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than 
the constitutional way of paying for the change.”121 Where to 
draw the line thus became the central question. 
The 1978 watershed case of Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City offered a clearer description of what 
would constitute a regulatory, as opposed to a traditional 
ouster-type taking.122 Although Grand Central Terminal in 
New York City had been designated a “landmark” by the city’s 
Landmarks Preservation Commission, the owner of Grand 
Central—Penn Central Transportation Corporation—requested 
permission to build a multi-story office building directly above 
the terminal.123 The Landmarks Commission refused and Penn 
Central went to court.124 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, although the 
Commission’s decision did not deny Penn Central all economic 
value in the station, it curtailed revenue that might otherwise 
have been anticipated.125 Denying, nevertheless, that Penn 
Central suffered a taking, the Court offered a nuanced 
analysis.126 
                                                          
 120. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960); see also Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 323–24 (contrasting physical takings with 
regulatory takings); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (“To require 
compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the 
government to regulate by purchase.”); Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 (“Government 
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for such change in the general law.”). 
 121. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 
at 354; E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 523 (plurality opinion); Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65; 
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 152. 
 122. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104, 123–28 (1978); see also Glynn S. 
Lunney, A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 1892, 1925 (1992) (discussing the Penn Central case); William S. 
Brewbaker, Health Care Price Controls and the Takings Clause, 21 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 669, 672–73 (1994) (discussing regulatory takings). 
 123. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 116. 
 124. Id. at 117. 
 125. See id. at 136–37. 
 126. See Lunney, supra note 122, at 1925–26. 
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While conceding Armstrong v. United States’ fundamental 
observation that the Takings Clause is “designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole,”127 the Court explained that “this Court, 
quite simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for 
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic 
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the 
government, rather than remain disproportionately 
concentrated on a few persons.”128 
The Court then described three factors by which to discern 
whether a regulation is so intrusive as to constitute a taking:129 
[1] the regulation’s economic impact on the claimant; [2] the 
extent to which it has interfered with investment-backed 
expectations; and [3] the character of the government action, in 
particular whether it features a physical invasion.130 
                                                          
 127. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
 128. Id. at 124; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 
(1984); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174–75 (1979). 
 129. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (“In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiries, the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that 
have particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant 
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A ‘taking’ 
may more readily be found when the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference 
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good.” (alteration in original) (citing 
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)) (other citations omitted)). 
 130. See id. Prof. Lunney identifies five “takings factors” in Penn Central: 
(1) [G]overnment action that deprived the owner of all economically 
viable use of his physical property; (2) government action that 
physically invaded an individual’s physical property; (3) government 
action that was “not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a 
substantial public purpose”; (4) government action that completely 
destroyed the bundle of rights in a physical thing; and (5) government 
action taken to acquire resources “to permit or facilitate uniquely 
public functions.” 
Lunney, supra note 122, at 1925. Lunney identifies six factors from Hodel v. 
Irving: 
(1) [T]he ordinance’s economic impact on particular individuals; (2) its 
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations; (3) its 
distribution of benefits and burdens (an average reciprocity of 
advantage); (4) the importance of the right affected by the ordinance 
to our common conception of property ownership; (5) the degree of 
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Takings jurisprudence subsequently evolved to distinguish 
more clearly between “per se” and “regulatory” takings. Per se 
takings generally feature either [1] a physical invasion or 
occupation;131 or [2] a complete destruction of the property’s 
economic value.132 In contrast, regulatory takings limit the 
owner’s use of his property short of ouster, as by zoning 
restrictions, rent control, or other regulation that may 
adversely affect but does not destroy the value of the 
property.133 
As discussed next, EMTALA requires a per se rather than 
regulatory takings analysis. In the case of a hospital, a 
regulatory analysis might be appropriate if, for example, a 
city’s new zoning regulations permitted an airport to be built 
very near a hospital, creating such noise that it rendered the 
hospital far less useable for health and healing.134 In this 
example the property would be the hospital as a whole, and a 
regulatory analysis would look to [a] the economic impact on 
the hospital, [b] the hospital’s investment-backed expectations, 
and [c] the character of the government invasion.135 
                                                          
restriction on the right affected by the ordinance; and (6) the ends-
means fit of the ordinance. 
Id. at 1926. Because subsequent analyses focus on the standard three factors 
from Penn Central, however, those will be the factors emphasized in this 
Article. 
 131. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Cable Television Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 428 (1982). 
 132. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). Lucas, 
along with Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), were arguably the first two 
cases that expressly identified two lines of takings jurisprudence—per se and 
regulatory. See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527–32 (1992). 
 133. Real property is usually, though not always, the target of regulatory 
takings. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 115. Occasionally, regulatory analysis is 
properly applied outside of real property. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 
522–24 (1998) (plurality opinion). Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel concerned a 
broad regulation affecting pension benefits in the coal industry. Id. at 503–04. 
Although takings problems are more commonly presented when “the 
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion 
by government, than when interference arises from some public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good,” economic regulation such as the Coal Act 
may nonetheless effect a taking. 
Id. at 522–23 (citation omitted). 
 134. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–67 (holding the Government’s noisy use 
of air space for military aircraft flights above the plaintiff’s land rendered his 
property effectively useless as a chicken farm). 
 135. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
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However, as Part II made plain, the property sacrificed 
under EMTALA is not the hospital as a whole.136 Rather, it is a 
broad panoply of personal property and the transient invasion 
of physical spaces within the hospital.137 The pharmaceutical is 
not being regulated; it is being consumed.138 The hour of 
nursing time is not being regulated; it is being spent.139 The 
ICU bed is not being regulated; it is being physically 
occupied.140 Accordingly, the next task is to examine per se 
takings jurisprudence: [1] physical invasion of property;141 and 
[2] complete destruction of a property’s economic value.142 
1. Per Se Taking: Physical Invasion or Occupation 
The lead case regarding physical occupation or invasion is 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.143 The state of 
New York had authorized cable television companies to install 
equipment on the roofs and sides of various buildings, 
including Plaintiff’s apartment building.144 Although these 
cable installations were small, the Court held that they 
“constitute[d] a taking under the traditional test. The 
installation involved a direct physical attachment of plates, 
boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the building, completely 
occupying space immediately above and upon the roof and 
along the building’s exterior wall . . . . [They] permanently 
appropriate[d] appellant’s property.”145 Deeming “a physical 
intrusion by government to be a property restriction of an 
unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings 
Clause,”146 the Court concluded that when the invasion is 
permanent, a taking has occurred.147 
                                                          
 136. See supra Part II. 
 137. See supra Part II.B. 
 138. See supra Part II.B. 
 139. See supra Part II.B. 
 140. See supra Part II.B. 
 141. Supra note 131. 
 142. Supra note 132. 
 143. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Cable Television Corp., 458 U.S. 
419 (1982). 
 144. Id. at 421–22. 
 145. Id. at 438 (citation omitted). 
 146. Id. at 426. 
 147. Id. 
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In these direct physical occupations, size does not 
matter.148 The government cannot enter Smith’s bank account, 
for instance, and simply take $100 to plant a tree in a park—
even if Smith is very wealthy and the tree will provide much-
needed shade.149 The “constitutional protection for the rights of 
private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the 
area permanently occupied.”150 
Equally important, the physical invasion or occupation 
need not be permanent.151 In the 2012 Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission v. United States decision, a unanimous152 Supreme 
Court held that intermittent flooding caused by government 
dam control could constitute a taking.153 As the Court observed, 
“our decisions confirm that takings temporary in duration can 
be compensable.”154 
                                                          
 148. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (“[R]egardless of whether the interest that is taken 
constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.”). 
 149. See id. (stating that the government “is required to pay for that share 
[of the property] no matter how small”). 
 150. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436. The Court continued: “Indeed, it is possible 
that in the future, additional cable installations that more significantly 
restrict a landlord’s use of the roof of his building will be made.” Id. at 437; see 
also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (“[W]here government 
requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property—
however minor—it must provide just compensation.”). As the Loretto court 
also pointed out: 
Finally, whether a permanent physical occupation has occurred 
presents relatively few problems of proof. The placement of a fixed 
structure on land or real property is an obvious fact that will rarely 
be subject to dispute. Once the fact of occupation is shown, of course, 
a court should consider the extent of the occupation as one relevant 
factor in determining the compensation due. For that reason, 
moreover, there is less need to consider the extent of the occupation 
in determining whether there is a taking in the first instance. 
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437–38 (citations omitted). 
 151. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 
(2012). 
 152. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 153. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522. 
 154. Id. at 519. The Court went on: 
This principle was solidly established in the World War II era, when 
“[c]ondemnation for indefinite periods of occupancy [took hold as] a 
practical response to the uncertainties of the Government’s needs in 
wartime.” . . . Notably in relation to the question before us, the 
takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances 
in which the Government took outright physical possession of the 
property involved. A temporary takings claim could be maintained as 
well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise 
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Ever since [these decisions], we have rejected the argument that 
government action must be permanent to qualify as a taking. Once 
the government’s actions have worked a taking of property, “no 
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to 
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was 
effective.”155 
2. Per Se Taking: Complete Destruction of Economic Value 
The lead case discussing complete destruction of a 
property’s economic value is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Commission.156 Plaintiff had purchased land along the South 
Carolina seashore in anticipation of building a real estate 
development.157 Subsequent zoning regulations rendered the 
land effectively useless for that or any other profitable 
purpose.158 “[W]hen the owner of real property has been called 
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of 
the common good, that is, to leave his property economically 
idle, he has suffered a taking.”159 In these cases the 
government is not simply “adjusting the benefits and burdens 
of economic life.”160 The act is “functionally equivalent to a 
                                                          
to “a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of 
the land.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & 
Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 261, 267 (1950); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 
(1946)) (other citations omitted). 
 155. Id. (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. 
Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 337 (“[W]e do not 
hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that 
it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given exclusive 
significance one way or the other.”). 
 156. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 157. Id. at 1006–07. 
 158. Id. at 1007–09. 
 159. Id. at 1019; see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc, 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) 
(stating that the regulation “completely deprive[s] an owner of all 
economically beneficial us[e] of her property” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); cf. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) 
(recognizing that land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it does not 
“‘den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land’” (quoting Agins v. 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))). 
 160. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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direct appropriation of or ouster from private property,”161 and 
hence obviates any need for “case-specific inquiry.”162 
B. EMTALA TAKINGS ANALYSIS 
Under an appropriate per se analysis, EMTALA plainly 
mandates takings.    
1. Physical Invasion or Occupation 
EMTALA’s effect on real property must be analyzed as a 
per se taking.163 Discrete spaces in the hospital are occupied by 
an EMTALA patient—a cubicle in the ER, an OR suite during 
surgery, an ICU bed or inpatient room. 
These intermittent invasions are, in essence, an imposed 
servitude or easement—a recognized genre of taking. Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, decided just one year after Penn 
Central, concerned a group of Hawai’ian homeowners who built 
a waterway to connect a pond, around which their homes were 
built, with a bay that then led to the Pacific Ocean.164 The 
federal government insisted that this homeowner-constructed 
waterway and pond now constituted a “navigable waterway” 
that must be open to the public at large.165 Rejecting that 
position, the Supreme Court held that imposing a navigational 
servitude would constitute a taking requiring just 
compensation.166 “In this case, we hold that the ‘right to 
exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the 
property right, falls within this category of interests that the 
Government cannot take without compensation.”167 
Analogously, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 
a California statute required Nollan, the owner of beachfront 
property, to allow public access to his part of the beach so that 
citizens could traverse from a public park on one side of his 
property to another park on the other side.168 The Court held 
                                                          
 161. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 529; see E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 
(1998) (Kennedy J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1014). 
 162. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
 163. See supra Part III.A.1–2. 
 164. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 166–67 (1979). 
 165. Id. at 170. 
 166. Id. at 180. 
 167. Id. at 179–80 (citations omitted). 
 168. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). 
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that the statute mandated a physical occupation and thus a 
taking: “We have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved 
by its owner for private use, the right to exclude others is one of 
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property.”169 
Finally, as discussed above, Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission similarly held that intermittent flooding caused by 
the Corps of Engineers’ dam control activities could be a 
taking.170 
In all these cases the outsiders’ invasion of private 
property was intermittent, not continuous. Boats would not be 
incessantly navigating between the pond and the ocean in 
Kaiser Aetna; beach walkers would not be constantly strolling 
in front of the private home in Nollan; and flooding was not 
steady in Arkansas Game & Fish. Nevertheless, the Court 
found takings because the possibility of physical occupation 
was always present.171 The Nollan Court deemed the Coastal 
Commission’s act to be more than “a mere restriction on [the 
property’s] use”172 and concluded: 
We think a “permanent physical occupation” has occurred, for 
purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent and 
continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may 
continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is 
permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.173 
The implication for hospitals’ ERs, ORs, ICUs and hospital 
rooms is obvious. EMTALA does not mean that a hospital will, 
every minute of every day, be caring for indigent emergency 
patients or that a defined set of resources or spaces will be used 
                                                          
 169. Id. at 831–32 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Cable 
Television Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)) (internal punctuation omitted). 
 170. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 
(2012); see supra Part III.A.1. 
 171. See id. at 518 (“[W]hen the government physically takes possession of 
an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to 
compensate the former owner.” (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002))). 
 172. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (quoting id. at 848 n.3 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting)). 
 173. Id. at 832. As the Loretto Court summarized Kaiser Aetna: “The Court 
emphasized that the servitude took the landowner’s right to exclude, ‘one of 
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.’” Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). And as Loretto added, “constitutional 
protection for the rights of private property cannot be made to depend on the 
size of the area permanently occupied.” Id. at 436–37. 
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each and every time. Rather, the possibility is ever-present 
that an indigent patient will appear with potentially very 
costly emergency needs. Any number of patients may appear—
an “intermittent flood” of need. The hospital must provide as 
much as each such patient needs, for as long as needed, to 
stabilize whatever emergency condition that patient has.174 The 
hospital has lost all right to exclude.175 It would be no different 
if government were to mandate that, on cold nights, Hiltons, 
Ritz Carltons, and all other hotels must provide free lodging to 
anyone who is homeless and shivering—with no provision 
whatever to compensate those hotels. 
2. Complete Destruction of Economic Value 
As discussed in Part II, EMTALA requires hospitals to use 
personal property such as pharmaceuticals, medical devices, 
medical and surgical supplies, food, and a host of items that are 
entirely consumed.176 Likewise completely consumed will be 
paid hours of staff time for nursing services, phlebotomy, etc., 
provided to EMTALA patients.177 Physician services are also 
included where physicians are employees rather than 
independent contractors.178 
                                                          
 174. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 175. The Loretto Court stated that: 
Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights 
“to possess, use and dispose of it.” . . . To the extent that the 
government permanently occupies physical property, it effectively 
destroys each of these rights. First, the owner has no right to possess 
the occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude the 
occupier from possession and use of the space. The power to exclude 
has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in 
an owner’s bundle of property rights. 
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (citations omitted); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc, 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (“A permanent physical invasion, however 
minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude 
others from entering and using her property—perhaps the most fundamental 
of all property interests.”). 
 176. See supra Part II.B. 
 177. As noted above, supra Parts I, III.B.1, these labor costs are sometimes 
absorbed into “rental” costs. 
 178. Matters may be different if the physician is an independent contractor 
with hospital privileges. See Burditt v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
934 F.2d 1362, 1374 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[F]ederal law controls the issue of 
whether a physician is ‘under contract’ with a hospital for purposes of 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2).”). 
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A per se takings analysis can apply to personal property, 
not just real property.179 The D.C. Circuit addressed the issue 
squarely in Nixon v. United States.180 When President Richard 
Nixon resigned from office, he sought exclusive possession of a 
large mass of documents, tape recordings, and other matters 
related to his presidency.181 Concerned that the ex-President 
might destroy important evidence in the Watergate 
investigation, the government invoked the Presidential 
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act.182 President Nixon 
argued that this represented an unconstitutional taking under 
the Fifth Amendment.183 Specifically responding to the 
argument that “the per se takings doctrine applies only to the 
physical occupation of real property,”184 the D.C. Circuit 
countered: “This argument fails for want of authority or 
logic.”185 
Accordingly, when hospitals’ personal property is 
consumed for EMTALA services, a taking can occur. The value 
of the drug, bandage, or food is entirely extinguished.186 
Equally important, the fact that only a small proportion of such 
property has been taken, relative to the hospital’s overall array 
of personal property, is irrelevant.187 Per Loretto, “our cases 
uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, 
                                                          
 179. See Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(stating that “Supreme Court cases have reaffirmed the per se doctrine 
without mention of any such distinction” between a taking of real or personal 
property). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1270–71. 
 182. Id. at 1271. 
 183. Id. at 1274–75. 
 184. Id. at 1284. 
 185. Id. (noting that while Loretto was expressly narrowly tailored, 
subsequent Supreme Court cases did not focus on real versus personal 
property). 
 186. The right to exclude others from these particular properties has been 
extinguished. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) 
(discussing how once a trade secret has been revealed, the right to exclude 
ends); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) 
(“Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, 
if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his 
interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking.”); Philip Morris, Inc. v. 
Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing tobacco companies’ 
inability to exclude others if their formulas were disclosed). 
 187. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Cable Television Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 434–35 (1982). 
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without regard to whether the action . . . has only minimal 
economic impact on the owner.”188 Size does not matter. 
3. Inapplicability of Regulatory Takings Analysis 
At this point it should be evident that regulatory takings 
analysis does not apply. As the Court made clear in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, it is “inappropriate to treat cases 
involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the 
evaluation of a claim that there has been a ‘regulatory taking,’ 
and vice versa.”189 As observed by the First Circuit, “once a per 
se rule has been announced, future courts do not have the 
luxury to consider the public interest, reasonable investment-
backed expectations, or economic impact”190 (the three-factor 
analysis of regulatory takings). Thus, once we recognize that 
the takings in question are per se rather than regulatory, it is 
simply incorrect to inquire whether the hospital “expected” to 
have its resources depleted by uncompensated emergency 
care,191 or how badly the hospital has been financially hurt by 
EMTALA’s cumulative impositions.192 The schoolboy may 
expect, even plan for, the fact that neighborhood bullies will 
regularly take his lunch money. But expectation does not 
convey legitimacy.193 
                                                          
 188. Id.; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) 
(“We have, however, described at least two discrete categories of regulatory 
action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest 
advanced in support of the restraint. The first encompasses regulations that 
compel the property owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property. In 
general (at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute 
the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we 
have required compensation.”). 
 189. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 323 (2002) (citation omitted). 
 190. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 191. Cf. Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 128 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(holding that highly-regulated industries should expect that governments will 
place constraints on them). 
 192. See id. at 127. 
 193. Note also how the Court found the taking of IOLTA interest money to 
be much more akin to the per se taking of Loretto than to a regulatory type of 
taking: 
[T]he interest earned in the IOLTA accounts “is the ‘private property’ 
of the owner of the principal.” [Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 
U.S. 156, 172 (1998).] If this is so, the transfer of the interest to the 
Foundation here seems more akin to the occupation of a small 
amount of rooftop space in Loretto. 
Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003). 
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IV. PUBLIC USE 
At first blush, EMTALA easily satisfies the “public use” 
requirement. It imposes takings on hospitals’ property for the 
public purpose of ensuring that all persons in a medical 
emergency, whether or not they can pay, will receive screening 
and stabilization.194 It is a protection surely all of us want: in a 
medical emergency, hospitals should provide immediate care 
without jeopardizing life and limb while they search the 
wreckage for an insurance card. 
An objection might be posed. In the classic takings cases 
such as eminent domain used to build a road, the property goes 
from a private party to the government.195 In contrast, the 
property in EMTALA cases ordinarily goes from one private 
party to another private party.196 
This does not preclude finding the public use required for a 
proper government taking, as the Court made clear in Kelo v. 
City of New London. In an attempt to revitalize the city’s 
faltering economy, New London condemned Petitioners’ private 
property—including waterfront homes that, in some cases, had 
been in the family for generations197—mandating that the 
homeowners sell their land to private developers as part of a 
                                                          
 194. The rationale was stated succinctly by the Arizona Court of Appeals in 
St. Joseph’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Maricopa County, 786 P.2d 983, 
987–88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). Like EMTALA, an Arizona law required 
hospitals to provide emergency care regardless of ability to pay. See id. at 984 
(discussing how Mr. Neu received emergency medical care from a hospital, 
ended up with a $50,000 bill but couldn’t pay back most of it so the hospital 
sought compensation from the county). Although hospitals were forbidden to 
go after spouses’ assets to pay an otherwise-indigent patient’s bill, the county 
nevertheless did count spousal assets in determining whether someone was 
eligible for county assistance. See id. at 986. Thus, hypothetically available 
spousal assets were in fact off-limits for collection. See id. at 985. The 
rationale of the system was to encourage spouses to step up and pay the bill 
anyway. See id. at 988. Per the court: “The aspect of the regulation that denies 
families county-funded health care if one spouse possesses assets in excess of 
the statutory limit also benefits the common good, because it encourages 
families to pay for services rendered for family members rather than allowing 
that burden to fall on state coffers.” Id. at 988. For a useful discussion of 
EMTALA’s history and somewhat dubious origins, see Hyman, supra note 7. 
 195. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 
(1980) (“[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public 
property without compensation . . . .”). 
 196. Property goes from the hospital to the patient. See supra Part II.B. 
 197. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005). 
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community revitalization plan.198 Petitioners protested that 
forcing private property owners to sell to private developers did 
not constitute the required “public use.”199 
The Court ruled that, notwithstanding the ultimately 
private ownership of the condemned land, the city’s decision to 
take it for economic development did satisfy the Fifth 
Amendment’s “public use” requirement.200 The Court 
emphasized its long history of “deference to legislative 
judgments” as to what government plans serve a “public 
purpose,”201 citing such cases as Berman v. Parker202 and 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.203 
As we will now see, the problem is not that EMTALA’s 
mandate imposes a virtually endless series of takings. The 
problem, rather, is that hospitals are not always compensated 
                                                          
 198. Id. at 472. 
 199. Id. at 475. 
 200. See id. at 489–90. 
 201. Id. at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 488–89 
(reasoning that the legislation had a legitimate purpose and using eminent 
domain as a means toward that end was not irrational, hence this 
constitutional requirement was satisfied). 
 202. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30, 35–36 (1954) (affirming the 
constitutionality of a redevelopment project in the District of Columbia, in 
which some of the land on which blighted housing stood went to private 
parties to build low-cost housing). 
 203. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984) (affirming a 
land redistribution plan to condemn land owned by long-standing landowners 
and eventually sell the land to the current lessees, because a high 
concentration of land was in a few hands and deemed an unhealthy oligopoly). 
The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is 
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not 
condemn that taking as having only a private purpose. The Court 
long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be 
put into use for the general public. “It is not essential that the entire 
community, nor even any considerable portion, . . . . directly enjoy or 
participate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public 
use.” 
Id. at 243–44 (alterations in original) (quoting Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 
U.S. 700, 707 (1923)). Analogous reasoning appears in National Railroad 
Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U. S. 407, 422–23 (1992), which 
upheld as legitimate “public use” the eminent domain sale of railroad track 
from one private company to another. Comparably, in Brown v. Legal 
Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003), the Court held that 
taking the interest on attorneys’ IOLTA trust accounts to fund legal services 
for the poor is a valid public purpose. In this phase of the analysis the Court 
does not consider whether eminent domain is actually an effective means of 
achieving the public use—the intent alone suffices. See Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005). 
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for the property taken. EMTALA appears to have been enacted 
as a politically and economically inexpensive way to broaden 
access to care without generating any new costs—or at least, no 
new costs for the government.204 Accordingly, we turn now to 
the question of whether and when there is “just compensation.” 
V. JUST COMPENSATION 
Clearly EMTALA mandates systematic takings. Per Part 
II, the property is not the hospital-as-a-whole, but personal 
properties and physical spaces. Per Part III, these are per se 
takings representing either a physical invasion or a complete 
destruction of economic value, while under Part IV, this is for 
“public use.” All the elements for a taking are satisfied. All that 
remains is a fight about the money. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with government acts of 
eminent domain. Indeed, the very existence of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause presupposes that takings can be 
acceptable. But when they occur, just compensation is 
imperative.205 As emphasized by Justice Holmes in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, “‘a strong public desire to 
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant 
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional 
way of paying for the change.’”206 
                                                          
 204. See, e.g., Richards supra note 7, at 592 n.3 (“Congress imposed its 
mandate on hospitals receiving federal Medicare funds. As a practical matter, 
this includes virtually all hospitals. As a constitutional matter, it allows 
Congress to rely on its broad authority under the Spending Clause. Medical 
care provided pursuant to these duties is not reimbursed; EMTALA was a 
political solution that allowed Congress to address inequities in emergency 
care without increasing federal spending.”). 
 205. As noted by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: 
We assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon the 
conviction that an exigency existed that would warrant it, and we 
assume that an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise of 
eminent domain. But the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of 
the changes desired should fall. 
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (emphasis added). 
 206. Id.; see Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 
519 (2012) (“Once the government’s actions have worked a taking of property, 
‘no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide 
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.’” (quoting 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987))); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council Inc. v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 328 (2002). 
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At first blush we might suppose EMTALA is completely 
unconstitutional because it mandates systematic takings with 
no provision for compensation. That would be simplistic, 
however. Hospitals can be compensated in several ways. 
First, because EMTALA is a condition of participation in 
Medicare, it might be supposed that hospitals’ compensation is 
the privilege of earning revenue by caring for Medicare 
patients and that, reciprocally, since no hospital is forced to 
participate in Medicare, a participating hospital should be 
deemed to accept EMTALA obligations voluntarily—the so-
called “voluntariness argument.” 
Second, the patients who receive the care can properly be 
expected under quantum meruit to pay for the valuable services 
the hospital provides, just as the business entities in Kelo were 
required to pay the original landowners. 
Third, it might be argued that EMTALA care does in fact 
receive government compensation. Not-for-profit hospitals, for 
instance, enjoy reduced tax obligations in exchange for a 
requirement to provide community service, usually via 
uncompensated care. Different types of hospitals will be 
considered separately: for-profit private hospitals, not-for-profit 
private hospitals, and public hospitals. 
Part V shows that all three arguments fail to one degree or 
another. 
A. THE VOLUNTARINESS ARGUMENT: EMTALA AS A MEDICARE 
CONDITION OF PARTICIPATION 
The first argument is that EMTALA is simply a condition 
of participation for hospitals contracting with Medicare.207 
Medicare participation provides nonmonetary compensation, 
namely, an opportunity to earn money by caring for Medicare 
beneficiaries.208 On this approach, because a hospital has no 
obligation to participate, it must accept the responsibilities if it 
wants the benefits. 
                                                          
 207. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(I) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 208. Cf. Tami Luhby, Medicare Payment Rates: $15,000 for One Hospital, 
$26,000 for Another, CNNMONEY (May 22, 2013, 5:55 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/22/news/economy/medicare-payments-
hospitals/index.html (stating that for hip replacement surgery, Medicare 
reimbursed the hospital only about 13% of what was billed). 
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1. Compensation As “Privilege to Earn Revenue” 
The “voluntariness” argument has appeared in several 
contexts. Outside the health care realm, for instance, attorneys 
are sometimes required to provide counsel, pro bono, for 
indigent criminal defendants.209 In White v. United States Pipe 
& Foundry Co.,210 the Fifth Circuit found no violation of the 
Takings Clause when District Courts appoint counsel to serve 
needy defendants.211 Citing an earlier case: 
“[A]n applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed 
to be aware of the traditions of the profession which he is joining, 
and to know that one of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer 
of the court obligated to represent indigents for little or no 
compensation upon court order.”212 
The strongest argument is not that these court 
appointments are a tradition. Slavery, after all, was 
“traditional” for hundreds of years in this nation and 
elsewhere. Nor would it be correct to suppose that there is no 
taking in the first place. The discussion above shows that of 
course there is a taking. The attorney’s labor is commandeered 
to serve a client not of her choosing; and the commandeering is 
for a public use (e.g., criminal defense for indigents). Rather, 
the best argument would simply be that the opportunity to 
earn a (sometimes handsome) living by practicing law is a 
privilege and that, if one wishes to enjoy this opportunity, the 
price is to donate a few free services now and then. The 
opportunity to practice is itself the “just compensation.”213 
                                                          
 209. See generally Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1309 
(5th Cir. 1977) (“While the statute does not require that one be a pauper 
before counsel may be appointed, a person’s financial resources should 
certainly be considered.”). 
 210. White v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 211. Cf. id. at 205 (identifying three factors courts should consider as “(1) 
the merits of the complainant’s claims of discrimination, (2) the efforts taken 
by the complainant to obtain counsel on his or her own, and (3) a 
complainant’s financial ability to retain counsel”). 
 212. Id. at 205 n.3 (quoting Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671, 672 (5th 
Cir. 1965)). 
 213. Clearly we could not make a similar argument for the minimum-wage 
fast-food worker and, for example, require them to donate their labors to soup 
kitchens. The “opportunity” for a minimum-wage job is not sufficient 
“compensation” for commandeering such labor. Additionally, as discussed just 
below, the “compensation” of being permitted to earn income in a particular 
way cannot be deemed just if the uncompensated services become excessive or 
oppressive. 
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Analogous reasoning has arisen regarding physicians’ 
services under EMTALA. Although EMTALA does not directly 
require physicians to serve emergency patients, hospitals with 
Medicare contracts are required to ensure that physicians are 
on call to provide emergency services.214 Indirectly, then, 
hospitals may mandate physicians’ services, albeit not 
necessarily uncompensated services. In Burditt v. U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services,215 a physician with 
staff privileges at a Medicare-participating hospital argued 
that his services were being taken without just compensation, 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.216 The court ruled that, 
even assuming arguendo that professional services constitute 
property,217 EMTALA binds hospitals, not physicians.218 Of 
particular relevance here, the Burditt court went on to explain 
that, for hospitals, the EMTALA mandate does not effect a 
taking because participation in Medicare is voluntary.219 
A number of cases share this view, particularly in the 
context of complaints that financial compensation from 
Medicare and Medicaid is so small as to be unjust, thereby 
violating the Takings Clause.220 Courts in these cases tend to 
                                                          
 214. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(j) (2012). 
 215. Burditt v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362 (5th 
Cir. 1991). 
 216. See id. at 1366. 
 217. Id. at 1376, 1376 n.12, (citing White v. United States Pipe & Foundry 
Co. as holding that “attorney services [are] not protected property under Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause”). As discussed above, this is not precisely what 
the White court found. Rather, the court stated that traditions requiring 
attorneys to provide pro bono services did not violate the Takings Clause. See 
White, 646 F.2d at 205 n.3. As argued, the most correct, forceful interpretation 
of White is not that professional services are not property or that there was no 
taking; rather, the appropriate argument would be that, although a mandate 
to provide uncompensated services does constitute a taking, there is no 
violation of the Fifth Amendment because the “compensation” is the privilege 
of earning a living practicing law. See id. As discussed below, however, such a 
mandate must be limited, because this form of “compensation” cannot be 
relied on to extract endless free labor. See supra Part V.A.2. 
 218. Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1376 (“EMTALA imposes no responsibilities 
directly on physicians; it unambiguously requires hospitals to examine and 
stabilize, treat, or appropriately transfer all who arrive requesting 
treatment.”). 
 219. See id. 
 220. See Methodist Hosp. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 860 F. Supp. 
1309, 1335 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (“Whether the new reimbursement rates 
constitute a taking of the hospital’s property without due process of law is a 
more interesting question.”). 
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find no constitutional problem: “Where a service provider 
voluntarily participates in a price regulated program or 
activity, there is no legal compulsion to provide service and 
thus there can be no taking.”221 
Accordingly, in Whitney v. Heckler222 physicians argued 
that a temporary freeze in Medicare payment rates constituted 
a taking of the physicians’ services, given that they could not 
ask patients to pay extra to make up the difference.223 The 
Eleventh Circuit held that because participation in Medicare 
was voluntary, there was no taking.224 Similarly, the Eighth 
Circuit held that a nursing home rate regulation for Medicaid 
residents was not a taking because the nursing home was not 
required to accept Medicaid recipients.225 Likewise, the First 
Circuit held that the low payment rates in MaineCare, Maine’s 
Medicaid program, did not constitute a taking because the 
plaintiff hospital voluntarily participated in the program.226 
More recently the Ninth Circuit issued a similar decision.227 
                                                          
 221. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Garelick v. Sullivan, 
987 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir.1993)). 
 222. Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 223. Id. at 972. 
 224. See id. at 974. 
 225. Minn. Ass’n of Health Care Facilities v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
742 F.2d. 442, 445–46 (8th Cir. 1984); see also In re Health Care Admin. Bd. v. 
Finley, 415 A.2d 1147, 1153–54 (N.J. 1980). 
 226. Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 123, 130 (1st Cir. 
2009). In a separate claim to be addressed below, the hospital also claimed 
that Maine’s mandate to provide completely uncompensated care to indigent 
patients was a taking. See infra Part VI. 
 227. Managed Pharmacy Case v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 934, 938, 950–51 (9th 
Cir. 2012). See Methodist Hospital v. Indiana Family & Social Services 
Administration, where a hospital and physicians asked the court to enjoin the 
state’s new Medicaid payment rates. 860 F. Supp. 1309, 1317 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 
Because the providers were required under EMTALA to see all emergency 
patients, including Medicaid patients, and because payment rates were lower 
than the cost of providing care, plaintiffs urged that these inadequate rates 
were a taking. Id. The court invoked a regulatory takings analysis, 
acknowledging that regulations that go too far could indeed be a taking. Id. at 
1334. Nevertheless, the court found no taking in this case because “‘where a 
service provider voluntarily participates in a price regulated program or 
activity, there is no legal compulsion to provide service and thus there can be 
no taking.’” Id. at 1335 (quoting Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 916 (2d 
Cir. 1993)); see also Burditt v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 
1362, 1376 (5th Cir. 1991) (ruling against a physician who claimed that 
EMTALA represented a taking, holding that EMTALA applies to hospitals, 
not physicians, and that the physician voluntarily served at this hospital, and 
hence accepted its on-call requirements). 
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2. Privilege to Earn as Dubious “Compensation” 
There are three major reasons to deny that the bare 
opportunity to participate in Medicare is, in itself, just 
compensation when EMTALA extracts a taking. 
First, it is questionable whether a privilege such as an 
opportunity to earn is the sort of “currency” that can count as 
compensation at all. The Supreme Court has been clear that, 
when the government compensates for a taking, there is no 
obligation to pay for intangible, consequential damages such as 
loss of good will or general injury to a business.228 
Compensation is for direct pecuniary losses, not for ancillary, 
“soft,” non-quantifiable losses.229 
If government need not pay for nonpecuniary losses, it is 
not clear how the government could be permitted, in an odd, 
                                                          
  For a broader discussion of underpayment for Medicare and Medicaid 
services, see generally Daniel Gottlieb, You Can Take This Health Insurance 
and . . . Mandate It?, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 535, 555–60 (2009) (analyzing 
whether the ACA’s individual mandate is a taking); Tammy Lundstrom, 
Under-Reimbursement of Medicaid and Medicare Hospitalizations as an 
Unconstitutional Taking of Hospital Services, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1243,     
1253–55 (2004) (proposing a different test to determine if the underpayment is 
a taking). 
 228. In United States v. General Motors Corp., the Court noted that 
[t]he rule in such a case is that compensation for that interest does 
not include future loss of profits, the expense of moving removable 
fixtures and personal property from the premises, the loss of good-will 
which inheres in the location of the land, or other like consequential 
losses which would ensue the sale of the property to someone other 
than the sovereign . . . . [I]t has generally been held that that which is 
taken or damaged is the group of rights which the so-called owner 
exercises in his dominion of the physical thing, and that damage to 
those rights of ownership does not include losses to his business or 
other consequential damage. 
323 U.S. 373, 379–80 (1945). The Court went on to explain that damage to 
fixtures and equipment and expenses of moving out of the leased space should 
be considered in determining the market price. Id. at 382–84. The Court 
expressly distinguished between these kinds of readily documentable 
expenses, which would be compensable, versus “proof of value peculiar to the 
respondent, or the value of good-will or of injury to the business of the 
respondent which, in this case, as in the case of the condemnation of a fee, 
must be excluded from the reckoning.” Id. at 383; see also Vickie J. Williams, 
Fluconomics: Preserving Our Hospital Infrastructure During and After a 
Pandemic, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 99, 125 (2007) (“[T]he loss to 
the owner of nontransferable value deriving from a unique need for the 
property, or a sentimental or illogical attachment to it . . . is not 
compensable.”). For a further explanation of consequential damages that do 
not require compensation, see Lunney, supra note 122, at 1903–05. 
 229. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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obverse move, to pay its debts with “soft,” nonpecuniary “cash.” 
That is, if nonpecuniary losses, such as consequential damages, 
cannot be compensated, surely nonpecuniary “payment” cannot 
serve as compensation. Simply allowing a physician, attorney 
or hospital to provide services and earn income should not 
masquerade as being, in and of itself, a just compensation that 
could plausibly substitute for money, particularly where 
enormous costs are routinely being generated. But that is 
precisely what we are asked to accept, in the “privilege to earn” 
argument.230 
Second, and more powerfully, it can be argued that 
Congress’ decision in 1986 to impose vast new financial losses 
on hospitals, on pain of losing all Medicare funding, was unduly 
coercive and that the acceptance of unfunded EMTALA 
obligations is anything but voluntary. 
The Supreme Court’s recent discussion of Medicaid 
expansion in NFIB231 is remarkably instructive. The ACA 
originally required states participating in Medicaid to expand 
eligibility to include all individuals at or below 133% of the 
FPL, on pain of forfeiting all Medicaid funding if they did 
not.232 This move, ruled the Court, was unconstitutionally 
coercive.233 Although the federal government can properly link 
conditions to its grants, a complete revocation of Medicaid 
funds would go too far, given the program’s financial 
significance to states.234 This is not a case of “relatively mild 
encouragement,” said the Court, “it is a gun to the head.”235 
“The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall 
                                                          
 230. If that is so, then the argument above, supra Part V.A.1, in White—
that it is an acceptable “tradition” to commandeer attorneys’ labor, for the 
public use and without compensation—must be rejected. “Once the 
government’s actions have worked a taking of property, ‘no subsequent action 
by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the 
period during which the taking was effective.’” Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519 (2012) (quoting First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 
(1987)). As argued above, it is to no avail for the government to argue that “we 
need this labor and we can’t afford to pay for it . . . therefore it is not a taking.” 
See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying discussion. 
 231. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 232. Id. at 2601. 
 233. Id. at 2604. 
 234. See id. 
 235. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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budget . . . is economic dragooning that leaves the States with 
no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”236 
Additionally, the Court explained that the imposed 
Medicaid expansion was “a shift in kind, not merely degree. 
The original program was designed to cover medical services 
for four specific categories of the needy: the disabled, the blind, 
the elderly, and needy families with dependent children.”237 
Expanding the program to encompass every indigent man, 
woman, and child below a specified income threshold was not a 
mere alteration or amendment to the program, it was a 
dramatic transformation.238 This exceeded Congress’ authority. 
“As we have explained, ‘[t]hough Congress’ power to legislate 
under the spending power is broad, it does not include 
surprising participating States with post-acceptance or 
‘retroactive’ conditions.’”239 
As the Court said, “[w]e have repeatedly 
characterized . . . Spending Clause legislation as much in the 
nature of a contract . . . . The legitimacy of Congress’s exercise 
of the spending power thus rests on whether the State 
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract,”240 
which requires that the State have “a legitimate choice 
whether to accept the federal conditions in exchange for federal 
funds.”241 In this case, states’ choice would be anything but 
voluntary. 
Admittedly, the Court’s arguments in NFIB are embedded 
in a broader discussion about the importance of maintaining 
the nation’s federalist system of two governments.242 Still, by 
                                                          
 236. Id. at 2605; see id. at 2604 (“Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 
percent of the average State’s total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 
83 percent of those costs.”). 
 237. Id. at 2605–06. 
 238. See id. at 2606. 
 239. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981)). 
 240. Id. at 2602 (alteration in original) (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 
U.S. 181, 186 (2002); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 241. Id. at 2602–03 (“In such a situation, state officials can fairly be held 
politically accountable for choosing to accept or refuse the federal offer. But 
when the State has no choice, the Federal Government can achieve its 
objectives without accountability.”). 
 242. See id. at 2602 (“Permitting the Federal Government to force the 
States to implement a federal program would threaten the political 
accountability key to our federal system.”). 
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analogy its arguments can nicely encompass Medicare’s 
EMTALA impositions on private entities such as hospitals. 
Medicare’s relationship with hospitals, like Medicaid’s 
relationship with states, essentially has the nature of a 
contract: if the hospital wants the opportunity to earn federal 
payments by caring for Medicare beneficiaries, it must comply 
with certain conditions.243 And in our case, just as with the 
ACA and Medicaid: [1] the addition of the EMTALA mandate to 
the Medicare program was a change in kind, not merely degree; 
while [2] the threat of withdrawing all of a hospital’s Medicare 
funding is so huge as to be coercive. 
Thus, regarding [1], a change in kind rather than just 
degree, Medicare as enacted in the mid-1960s was a program in 
which the federal government would reimburse medical care 
for the elderly and people with certain disabilities.244 In 1986 
with EMTALA, Medicare suddenly exposed hospitals to a flood 
of emergently ill and injured people who were neither elderly 
nor disabled—often for no compensation whatsoever.245 This 
was not a modest alteration, it was a fundamental 
transformation of Medicare. 
Regarding [2], EMTALA’s financial coercion of hospitals is 
considerably stronger than anything the ACA might pose for 
states. With the possible exception of some boutique facilities, 
few hospitals can survive without Medicare. The program 
represents more than 30% of many hospitals’ budgets,246 while 
Medicare and Medicaid together “account for about 55% of 
hospital revenues.”247 People over age sixty-five now comprise 
13% of the total population248—a figure that will rise as more 
Baby Boomers reach retirement age.249 Surely, if threatening a 
                                                          
 243. See Lundstrom, supra note 227, at 1245 n.20. 
 244. See id. 
 245. See supra notes 4–11. 
 246. As of 2002, the two programs comprised just over 47% of hospital 
revenues—approximately 30% from Medicare and 17% from Medicaid. 
Lundstrom, supra note 227, at 1248. 
 247. Robert Pear, Administration Offers Health Care Cuts as Part of 
Budget Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
07/05/us/05deficit.html?pagewanted=all. 
 248. Emily Brandon, 65-and-Older Population Soars, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 9, 
2010), http://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/articles/2012/01/09/65-and-
older-population-soars. 
 249. See id. (“The 65-and-older population jumped 15.1 percent between 
2000 and 2010 . . . .”). 
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state with losing 10% of its budget250 is unduly coercive,251 it is 
no less coercive to force hospitals to abandon 30% of their 
budgets (i.e., all Medicare revenues) to avoid the costs of 
uncompensated EMTALA services. 
In sum, EMTALA hoisted a “gun to the head,”252 imposing 
on hospitals an “economic dragooning”253 that gave them little 
choice: either acquiesce in a major unfunded expansion of their 
Medicare obligations, or lose not merely some sort of 
supplemental funds directed toward expanding ED access 
(there were no such funds), but lose all Medicare revenues, and 
additionally pay penalties and face potential civil liability for 
failure to comply. “Voluntary” hardly fits such a “choice.” 
Third, such coercion, even if dubbed “voluntary” 
participation, would be very poor health policy. Essentially this 
argument says to hospitals: “If you don’t want to bear all those 
unfunded EMTALA costs, then all you need to do is just quit 
caring for Medicare patients, or close your EDs and shut down 
all your specialty facilities.” Many hospitals have in fact 
shuttered EDs, due in part to EMTALA costs.254 Surely the last 
                                                          
 250. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 
(2012) (“The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall 
budget . . . is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option 
but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”). 
 251. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“THE CHIEF JUSTICE acknowledges that Congress may ‘condition the 
receipt of [federal] funds on the States’ complying with restrictions on the use 
of those funds,’ but nevertheless concludes that the 2010 expansion is unduly 
coercive.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 252. Id. at 2604 (majority opinion) (“In this case, the financial ‘inducement’ 
Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is 
a gun to the head.”). 
 253. Id. at. 2605. 
 254. See Renee Y. Hsia, Arthur L. Kellermann & Yu-Chu Shen, Factors 
Associated with Closures of Emergency Departments in the United States, 305 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1978, 1980 (2011) (finding that from 1990 to 2009, EDs 
closed at a rate of 27%); Roni Caryn Rabin, Fewer Emergency Rooms Available 
as Need Rises, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/
18/health/18hospital.html (noting that despite there being less EDs, the total 
number of ER visits increased by 35%); Rand Health, Why Are Many 
Emergency Departments in the United States Closing?, RAND CORP., 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2011/RAND_RB9
607.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) (“The study revealed that between 1990 
and 2009, the number of ERs in nonrural U.S. hospitals declined by 27 percent 
(from 2,446 to 1,779).”); see also W. Wesly Fields et al., The Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act as a Federal Health Care Safety Net 
Program, 8 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1064, 1067 (2001) (reporting that ED 
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thing the federal government should be doing, just as the Baby 
Boom generation enters Medicare, is to encourage hospitals to 
abandon this entire population. Likewise, shuttering more EDs 
and specialty facilities would hardly be a public health 
success.255 
B. JUST COMPENSATION: PATIENTS 
In sum, permitting a hospital to participate in Medicare 
does not count as “just compensation” for imposing enormous 
otherwise-uncompensated takings, nor can we dismiss 
hospitals’ EMTALA costs as simply the product of a “voluntary” 
choice. 
We turn to potential sources of real payment. Imagine that 
someone is brought unconscious from a motor vehicle wreck to 
the ER with life-threatening injuries, and the hospital provides 
appropriate screening and stabilization. This is a per se taking 
because the policy serves the public use (we all want assurance 
of such care) and the hospital must provide these services and 
products with no assurance of payment and no possibility of 
excluding anyone who might not pay.256 Suppose now that the 
patient recovers nicely and pays the bill in full. Although there 
was a taking it was justly compensated, hence not 
unconstitutional. 
But what about the patient who does not pay? To be sure, 
the patient has an obligation under quantum meruit to pay the 
fair value of services rendered in his time of need—as every 
first-year law student learns in contracts course.257 Some 
                                                          
closure rates are 27% higher than those for hospitals); Kristofor Husted, 
Emergency Room Closures Hit Minorities, Poor Hardest, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Nov. 16, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/11/16/
142392761/emergency-room-closures-hit-minorities-poor-hardest (“Another 
recent study by Hsia found a 27 percent decline in nonrural emergency 
departments across the country from 1990 to 2009.”); Ryan Jaslow, Emergency 
Departments are Closing Their Doors: Why?, CBS NEWS.COM (May 18, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-20063964-10391704.html. 
 255. A final count against the “voluntariness” argument comes from the 
fact that these arguments commonly presuppose that any such taking would 
be a regulatory rather than per se taking. That is, these cases presume that 
EMTALA “regulation” simply makes an incremental change in the value of 
the property. As shown above, supra Parts III.A, III.B.3, and discussed just 
below, a regulatory takings analysis is inappropriate for EMTALA takings. 
 256. See supra Part I. 
 257. See Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164, 165 (Ark. 1907) (“[A] person 
utterly bereft of all sense and reason by the sudden stroke of an accident or 
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courts have insisted that hospitals should force the near-
indigent to liquidate their assets.258 But in reality, not everyone 
can pay, and not everyone who can pay chooses to pay. Some 
courts suggest that both scenarios should simply be written off 
as the kind of “bad debt” any hospital must absorb as a part of 
doing business.259 
Those courts are mistaken. If the patient fails to pay, a 
taking becomes unconstitutional for lack of just compensation. 
The reason becomes clear when we examine other takings that 
send property from private party to private party, as in Kelo v. 
City of New London.260 The fact that under eminent domain 
property can permissibly go from private party to private party 
does not mean that the transaction could legitimately feature 
no compensation to the original owners.261 
Suppose, for instance, that one of the private developers in 
Kelo had simply refused to pay after receiving the property. 
Although no case law has appeared on the issue, only one 
conclusion fits with the Fifth Amendment. If the government 
mandates that a homeowner like Susette Kelo sell her property 
to a private party like Pfizer Inc., then the government must 
make sure that Pfizer actually pays Kelo. Government must, in 
                                                          
disease may be held liable, in assumpsit, for necessaries furnished to him in 
good faith while in that unfortunate and helpless condition.”). 
 258. See, e.g., Bay Gen. Cmty. Hosp. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 203 Cal. Rptr. 
184, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“In sum, the private hospital will have to seek 
recovery from the working poor’s assets which elevate them above the Medi-
Cal cut off level. This is a harsh divestiture process but the remedy is 
legislative action.”); see also Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 
129–30 (1st Cir. 2009) (arguing that hospitals may bill the patient directly for 
any amount remaining after payment by insurer or medical assistance 
program). 
 259. See, e.g., St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Maricopa Cnty., 786 P.2d 
983, 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (“We do not know what percentage of that figure 
is expected profit, nor do we know the impact these regulations have had on 
the hospital’s overall profitability. Presumably, these ‘bad debts’ are absorbed 
by the hospital as a cost of doing business and are ultimately passed on to the 
consumer.”). 
 260. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485–86 (2005) (finding 
that transfers from one private party to another could satisfy the “public use” 
requirement). 
 261. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243–44 (1984) 
(requiring transfer of large areas of land to be transferred from a few 
oligopolistic owners to a broader proportion of the population); Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 31, 33–34 (1954) (requiring owners of commercial as well 
as residential property to sell to private developers as part of an urban 
revitalization plan). 
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effect, be the guarantor of the transaction. And if Pfizer fails to 
pay,262 then the government must either pay just compensation 
or return the property to Kelo. The government could then go 
after Pfizer for reimbursement. The one thing it assuredly may 
not do is to say to Kelo, “Gosh, Susette . . . looks like you got 
stiffed . . . sorry ‘bout that . . . guess you’d better just chalk it 
off to bad debt.” Such a scenario would clearly create an 
unconstitutional taking.263 
In emergency care there is no possibility of returning the 
property to the hospital. The pharmaceuticals, medical devices, 
nursing time, and ER/OR/ICU space availability have been 
completely consumed in caring for the EMTALA patient. 
Economic value has been extinguished and physical space has 
been invaded.264 If the patient does not pay, the government 
must do so, a just amount.265 That is, the federal government 
must either ensure the patient pays or it must pay, itself.266 
A related issue concerns the so-called “cost-shifting” by 
which many hospitals have historically covered costs of 
indigent care: charge more to paying patients.267 Some courts 
                                                          
 262. The example here is purely hypothetical, and there is no reason to 
think Kelo was not paid the sum designated in the eminent domain 
transaction. 
 263. See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 234 (holding constitutional a 
takings plan where land prices were set by a condemnation trial or 
negotiations between the lessors and lessees). 
 264. See supra Part III. 
 265. See supra notes 205–06. 
 266. In a related question we must consider how to identify which patients 
should be expected to pay for their care, and who should be deemed indigent. 
Realistically, the FPL does not help us to identify medical indigency very well. 
Medical care is so costly, particularly for a serious emergency, that nearly 
anyone who lacks insurance will be or quickly become medically indigent, i.e., 
unable to pay the bill out of his or her own pocket. See St. Joseph’s Hosp. & 
Med. Ctr. v. Maricopa Cnty., 635 P.2d 527, 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). The 
medical bill can itself send the patient below the poverty line. See id. (arguing 
that the patient became indigent while in the hospital because of the bill). 
This issue will not be resolved in this Article. As elsewhere in the law, the 
appropriate analysis will likely focus on the reasonableness of what the person 
should be expected to pay, given his means and other necessary expenses. See, 
e.g., Franklin Mem’l Hospital v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 129–30 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 267. See, e.g., Lester C. Thurow, Medicine Versus Economics, 313 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 611, 612 (1985) (“Overtly (by having insurance systems 
contribute to a pool to pay for the costs of the uninsured) or covertly (by 
charging paying patients more than their costs and using the extra funds to 
subsidize those no insured), funds are being extracted from the current system 
to pay for the uninsured.”). 
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find “nothing invidious in the notion that to establish (a just 
and reasonable return on equity) the [nursing] home may have 
to charge its paying patients sufficient to enable it to carry a 
reasonable number of [under-paying] Medicaid patients.”268 
Applied to EMTALA, however, under this reasoning the 
government effects payment to the hospital by taking it from 
another innocent party who clearly does not owe the money. 
Instead of wrongly forcing the hospital to absorb the cost of 
EMTALA-mandated care, the government would now wrongly 
force other patients and their insurers to absorb it—expenses 
that are thereafter, of course, transferred yet again to still 
other people who pay either via higher insurance costs or via 
lower wages. The fact that the costs of the initial taking have 
now been diffused onto a broader variety of parties does not 
render it any less a taking, nor does it mean that the dearth of 
government compensation has somehow become “just.” 
Even if cost-shifting is so successful that the hospital 
becomes wealthy and can “afford” the EMTALA losses, the 
government must still pay.269 If the government may not take 
$100 from a millionaire to plant a tree in a public park because 
“he can afford it,” then neither may it take assets from affluent 
hospitals or from their paying patients, even for a worthy 
cause. 
If the government replies that it simply must ordain such 
cost-shifting, lest society lose this important benefit, the 
Supreme Court has a reply. In Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission the government insisted that, if the Court were to 
                                                          
 268. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 635 P.2d at 535 (alteration in original) (quoting 
N.J. Ass’n of Health Care Facilities v. Finley, 402 A.2d 246, 254 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1979)) (internal punctuation marks omitted). In a different case 
featuring the same Arizona hospital and county, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
held that a hospital could not seek reimbursement from the county because 
the patient did not meet the legal standards for being an indigent. St. Joseph’s 
Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Maricopa Cnty., 786 P.2d 983, 989 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). 
The county’s formula for identifying indigency included spousal assets—even 
though the hospital would be forbidden to go after spousal assets to pay the 
hospital bill in question. See id. at 985–86. Per the court: “The aspect of the 
regulation that denies families county-funded health care if one spouse 
possesses assets in excess of the statutory limit also benefits the common 
good, because it encourages families to pay for services rendered for family 
members rather than allowing that burden to fall on state coffers.” Id. at 988. 
While we may or may not wish to oppose requirements for spouses to support 
one another, the reality is that “cost-shifting” spreads the costs of 
uncompensated care far beyond the borders of the family unit. 
 269. See supra notes 205–06. 
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deem its intermittent flooding a taking, then this could disrupt 
a broader public good, namely, its efforts toward flood 
control.270 The Court flatly rejected the argument: 
The slippery slope argument, we note, is hardly novel or unique to 
flooding cases. Time and again in Takings Clause cases, the Court 
has heard the prophecy that recognizing a just compensation claim 
would unduly impede the government’s ability to act in the public 
interest . . . . We have rejected this argument when deployed to urge 
blanket exemptions from the Fifth Amendment’s instruction. While 
we recognize the importance of the public interests the Government 
advances in this case, we do not see them as categorically different 
from the interests at stake in myriad other Takings Clause cases.271 
C. JUST COMPENSATION: FEDERAL PAYMENTS TO HOSPITALS 
1. For-Profit Private Hospitals 
As discussed, the patient who receives an EMTALA benefit 
can be expected to pay fair market value (FMV) for his care, 
whether out of pocket or through an insurer. However, when 
the patient cannot or does not pay, it becomes essential to 
explore other avenues for just compensation. We have seen that 
the federal government that mandates this taking cannot 
provide just compensation by extracting (taking) it from 
someone else—whether from the hospital, a local municipality, 
the state, or, as noted just above, from other patients. As the 
feds incur the debt, the feds must pay the debt. Still, there may 
be existing avenues by which this is already being done. To 
these we now turn. 
The paradigmatic scenario in which an EMTALA taking is 
unconstitutional is the for-profit private hospital that pays a 
full load of taxes and has no Hill-Burton obligations—hence 
has no obligations to render uncompensated care as a 
community benefit272—and which then provides emergency 
care for a medically indigent patient. This sort of case typically 
represents a taking with no compensation at all, a clear 
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
Immediately the question arises, how much compensation 
is “just.” While it is not the purpose of this Article to delve into 
this question, a few remarks may be useful. From United States 
                                                          
 270. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012). 
 271. Id. at 521 (citations omitted). 
 272. See supra note 19. 
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v. General Motors Corp., FMV appears to be key.273 Also 
important, compensation should focus on what the property 
owner lost, not on what the government gained.274 
Admittedly, identifying “market value” for health care 
services can be difficult. On one hand, hospitals should 
ordinarily be able to monetize reasonably well the actual costs 
of any given episode of emergency care. They can compute the 
per-unit cost they pay for pharmaceuticals and devices; the per-
hour salaries they pay physicians, nurses, and allied providers; 
and the per-hour or per-day value of ER, OR, ICU, and 
inpatient bed time. Compared with more nuanced questions 
about, for example, real estate value,275 hospital services 
should pose fewer problems of proof.276 
On the other hand, we also need to factor in a reasonable 
rate of return over the bare costs to the institution. In health 
care this question can be uniquely complicated. The prices 
charged for various products and services often have little 
connection with the cost of providing them. Hospitals 
commonly identify their “rack-rate” prices via a “Charge 
Master” that lists the hospital’s official prices for thousands of 
goods and services. Those charges may have little relationship 
with the cost of providing the service.277 
                                                          
 273. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945) 
(“[T]he compensation to be paid is the value of the interest taken. Only in the 
sense that he is to receive such value is it true that the owner must be put in 
as good position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. In the 
ordinary case, for want of a better standard, market value, so called, is the 
criterion of that value.”). 
 274. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 236 (2003) (holding 
that just compensation is measured according to the owner’s loss); United 
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (holding the value is determined by 
“the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain”); General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 378 
(holding the deprivation of the former owner constitutes the taking). 
 275. In Midkiff’s land transfers, prices for the properties were to be set 
either by a condemnation trial or by negotiation between the parties 
themselves. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 229 (1984). 
 276. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Cable Television Corp, 458 
U.S. 419, 437–38 (1982) (pointing out that per se takings tend to present fewer 
problems of proof, compared with regulatory takings). 
 277. Charge Masters have historically been adjusted frequently and kept 
confidential. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, High-Deductible Health Plans: New 
Twists on Old Challenges from Tort and Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 
1253 (2006). They are known to include considerable internal cost-shifting, as 
the price for one common service or product might be raised substantially to 
cover the cost of an essential but costly service that could not otherwise pay 
for itself. Id. at 1254. Charge Master prices vary widely, sometimes wildly, 
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At the same time, many payors’ actual payments to 
hospitals are based, not on Charge Master prices, but on a pre-
negotiated payment structure. Many insurers, from Medicare 
to private insurers, use a lump-sum approach, whether a per-
diem fee or a diagnosis-based amount calculated according to 
the patient’s diagnosis and other factors.278 Ultimately, 
therefore, the initial price of a product or service often has only 
a limited relationship to either the hospital’s costs or to a 
putative FMV.279 
                                                          
from one hospital to another. See Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills 
Are Killing Us, TIME, Feb. 20, 2013, at 16, 22 (“No hospital’s chargemaster 
prices are consistent with those of any other hospital . . . .”). And even within a 
hospital, the price charged to one patient can be very different from that 
charged to another, depending on the specific discounts negotiated with each 
patient’s insurer. See id. at 23 (discussing how despite one patient’s bill being 
high, the hospital spokesman insisted “most people never pay those rates”). 
Cost-shifting also is spread across various types of payers, for example, as 
private payers tend to pay more for a given service than government insurers 
such as Medicare and Medicaid. See Williams, supra note 228, at 105 (“As part 
of this system, one payor group (usually private health insurers) may 
systematically pay substantially higher prices to offset lower prices paid by 
another payor group (usually the federal and state governments, or patients 
paying out-of-pocket).”). 
 278. See Williams, supra note 228, at 108–09. Medicare established its 
Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) payment system in the early 1980s as an 
alternative to traditional fee-for-service. See Bruce C. Vladeck, Medicare 
Hospital Payment by Diagnosis-Related Groups, 100 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
576, 576 (1985). Instead of paying the hospital more, the longer the patient 
stayed and the more services he received, the DRG payment would be fixed 
according to the patient’s main diagnosis and related factors. See id. at      
577–81. Here, the incentive is to achieve efficient service and prompt 
discharge, rather than to maximize services. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 
228, at 108. 
 279. Nevertheless, hospitals are increasingly asked to provide 
transparency regarding the cost and value of their services. See generally 
Brill, supra note 277 (discussing how difficult the author found it to ask a 
hospital for its prices and find out why one patient’s bill was so high). 
Individuals facing ever-rising deductibles are much more likely to ask about 
costs and to engage in price-shopping, even as businesses try to obtain greater 
control over this important cost. It is likely that in the future, to the extent 
that the health care system still relies on a fee-for-service approach to paying 
providers, the price of a service will more closely correlate with the actual cost 
of providing it. At the same time, to the extent that health care is increasingly 
compensated via “bundled” payments that cover a broad episode of care rather 
than each individual Band-aid and blood-draw, it will be necessary to find 
some reasonable way to monetize the value of EMTALA-mandated care. See 
David M. Cutler & Kaushik Ghosh, The Potential for Cost Savings Through 
Bundled Episode Payments, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1075, 1077 (2012) 
(analyzing cost savings under different bundled-payment systems); Robert 
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We need not resolve that tangle here.280 Suffice it to say 
that EMTALA takings must be compensated in a way that 
fairly captures market value in some way that reasonably 
exceeds the bare cost of providing the care.281 
Plainly too, it would be incorrect to consider the hospital’s 
overall financial condition and conclude that, if the hospital is 
fiscally sound, then it can “afford” to care for indigent 
emergency patients.282 If the federal government takes, then 
the federal government, not someone else, must pay. 
                                                          
Mechanic & Christopher Tompkins, Lessons Learned Preparing for Medicare 
Bundled Payments, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1873, 1875 (2012) (discussing 
variations on payments); William Weeks et al., The Unintended Consequences 
of Bundled Payments, 158 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 62, 63 (2013) (explaining 
that care must be taken to avoid encouraging hospitals to treat “healthy” 
patients over “sick” patients to keep costs below bundled payments). 
 280. For recent cases concerning the reasonableness of hospitals’ charges, 
see Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 955 N.E.2d 804, 809–10 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2011), rev’d, 980 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. 2012) (discussing the difficulty in 
determining the reasonable value of medical services); St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. 
Reeves, 356 S.W.3d 813, 815–16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that customary 
charges in the industry for services rendered could be proof of reasonableness). 
For further discussion of the “reasonableness” of hospital charges, see 
generally Morreim, supra note 277, at 1258–59 (discussing the difficulty in 
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee). 
 281. See generally Lundstrom, supra note 227, at 1246–47 (explaining that 
reimbursements must meet the fair standard test by allowing hospitals to 
operate successfully and compensate investors for risk assumed). It should be 
noted that, although regulatory takings jurisprudence permits the “give and 
take” of life in society to impair the value of one’s property without actually 
rendering that impairment a taking, EMTALA cases are per se takings, not 
regulatory takings. See, for example, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979), 
where the court held that “the denial of one traditional property right does not 
always amount to a taking;” and Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522–23 
(1992), where the court held that a regulation is a taking only if it unfairly 
singles out the property owner to bear a public burden. It is therefore 
imperative that just compensation be identified and paid for each such taking. 
 282. In a case like Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, it would be 
irrelevant whether the Commission could “afford” to repair the damage of the 
federal government’s intermittent flooding. If the government caused the 
damage, the government must pay for the damage. In the same vein it did not 
matter whether General Motors could “afford” to absorb the damage caused by 
a federal usurpation of its leased space and damaged fixtures, or had other 
ways to pay for the damage. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 
U.S. 373, 379 (1945) (holding that compensation paid is to be “the value of the 
interest taken”). 
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2. Not-For-Profit Private Hospitals 
The challenge to define “just compensation” is more 
complex for tax-exempt hospitals.283 Not-for-profit (NFP) 
hospitals are spared substantial tax payments in exchange for 
an obligation to provide charity care or other community 
benefits.284 These could include emergency services. 
This Article will make no attempt to determine what a 
“just” level of EMTALA compensation is,285 nor to determine 
how much, or by what formula, a tax exempt hospital’s indigent 
care obligations should be calculated, or how they should be 
allocated between EMTALA versus other kinds of services. 
Nevertheless, it will be useful to note significant complexities 
attending this task. Since EMTALA carries no direct 
compensation286 we will distinguish between the indirect 
compensation that can properly count toward the federal 
EMTALA obligation, and that which cannot be counted. 
i. What the Federal Government Can Count Toward 
EMTALA Debt 
Exemption from federal taxes287 obviously can count so 
long as the value of tax savings equals or exceeds the total 
                                                          
 283. Hill-Burton obligations should be considered alongside tax exemption, 
but they will not be expressly discussed here. Funding under the Act ceased in 
1997 and, at present, only around 200 hospitals in the United States still have 
Hill-Burton obligations. Hill-Burton Free and Reduced-Cost Health Care, 
HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/gethealthcare/
affordable/hillburton/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2013); see also Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. 
Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170, 172–75 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing the obligations 
hospitals must fulfill if they receive Hill-Burton funding); Richards, supra note 
7, at 597–98 (describing how the Hill-Burton Act’s lack of punitive measures 
made it ineffective). 
 284. See What Is the Difference Between Nonprofit Hospitals and For-Profit 
Hospitals?, MEDICARE NEWSGROUP (Sept. 21, 2013), 
http://www.medicarenewsgroup.com/news/medicare-faqs/individual-
faq?faqId=31a98723-ad91-4801-9bd8-1f968a7c0f1b. 
 285. Identifying fair compensation for hospitals might, for example, be 
determined according to the “fair return on investment” approach used for 
public utility price regulation. See Thomas W. Merrill, Constitutional Limits 
on Physician Price Controls, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 635, 653–56 (1994) 
(proposing that fair return on investment be used to set payment for physician 
services under Medicare and Medicaid). 
 286. See supra Part I. The lone exception, of course, would be Medicare 
patients’ ER visits, assuming that compensation for these is “just.” 
 287. To the extent a tax-exempt hospital also is relieved of state and/or 
local taxes, those government entities, and not the federal government, would 
266 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:1 
 
FMV of EMTALA services. Of note, it can be difficult to discern 
just how much indigent care an NFP hospital actually provides, 
whether for ER patients or more broadly. Some hospitals 
purportedly fail to make energetic collection efforts, then 
improperly identify this bad debt as charitable care.288 In 
response to this problem, the ACA places new requirements on 
tax-exempt hospitals.289 
Additionally, the federal government makes a variety of 
payments to hospitals that could theoretically be applied to 
EMTALA debt. Any time government payment for Medicare 
beneficiaries exceeds the FMV of those particular services, any 
“excess” could theoretically count toward EMTALA debt. This 
Article makes no attempt to determine whether hospitals290 are 
“overpaid” for Medicare services. Suffice it to say the issue is 
controversial, but that any such overpayments could, in 
principle, apply to EMTALA. 
                                                          
have authority to determine what kinds of service will count as the community 
benefit the hospital is expected to provide. 
 288. Reciprocally, others are said to have engaged in aggressive collection 
tactics, even for patients reasonably deemed medically indigent. See, e.g., Nina 
Bernstein, Hospitals Flout Charity Aid Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/nyregion/study-finds-new-york-hospitals-
flout-charity-rules.html?_r=1&ref=health (describing hospitals in New York 
state that appear to be pursuing aggressive debt-collection tactics, even after 
receiving significant payments from a state-sponsored fund to cover charity 
care); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Debt Collector Is Faulted for Tough Tactics in 
Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
04/25/business/debt-collector-is-faulted-for-tough-tactics-in-
hospitals.html?_r=2&nl=afternoonupdate&emc=edit_au_20120424. 
 289. Each tax-exempt hospital will be required to maintain a financial 
assistance policy (FAP) and an emergency medical care policy, under which 
the hospital will limit the amounts that will be charged to eligible individuals. 
26 U.S.C. § 501(r) (2012). Hospitals must refrain from extraordinary 
collections efforts until after making reasonable efforts to determine that 
person’s FAP eligibility. Id. § 501(r)(6). These hospitals must also conduct 
community health needs assessments on a regular basis. Id. § 501(r)(3). On 
April 5, 2013 the IRS issued proposed regulations to address this requirement 
under section 501(r)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). See Community 
Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,523 
(proposed Apr. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 53) (providing 
guidance on assessment, tax, and reporting requirements and consequences 
for failing to meet them). 
 290. The question whether Medicare “overpays” for physician services is 
irrelevant in this setting, since EMTALA does not bind physicians. See Burditt 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1376 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that “physicians only voluntarily accept responsibilities under 
EMTALA”). 
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Medicare also helps pay for physician training via Direct 
Graduate Medical Education (DGME) payments to teaching 
hospitals.291 Where the paid labor of these physicians-in-
training is spent caring for emergency patients, it could count 
toward EMTALA debt. Conversely, when the trainee is caring 
for a nonemergency patient, then that portion of the DGME 
payment is not legitimately credited. 
Medicare also makes “disproportionate share hospital” 
(DSH) payments to hospitals providing a disproportionate 
share of uncompensated care, some portion of which could 
count toward EMTALA.292 However, these payments are slated 
to decrease by up to 75% under the ACA, based on the Act’s 
presumption that the number of un- and under-insured people 
would fall dramatically.293 
Across these funding sources, dollars must not be counted 
twice. If $1000 is designated for John Doe, a Medicare 
beneficiary with an elective hip replacement, and if the 
Medicare payment barely covers the FMV of Doe’s care, then 
the same $1000 cannot also count toward EMTALA debt. 
Obvious as this point seems, it could nevertheless be tempting 
for the government to say “we pay you all this money . . . surely 
it is enough to cover EMTALA takings.” The accounting must 
                                                          
 291. See, e.g., Medicare Direct Graduate Medical Education (DGME) 
Payments, ASS’N AM. MED. CS., https://www.aamc.org/advocacy/gme/71152/
gme_gme0001.html (last updated May 31, 2012) (describing how DGME 
payments compensate teaching hospitals for training costs incurred treating 
Medicare patients). 
 292. The Medicaid DSH program was initiated in 1981 to help defray the 
costs for hospitals serving particularly large numbers of low-income patients. 
ROBERT E. MECHANIC, NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, MEDICAID’S 
DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL PROGRAM: COMPLEX STRUCTURE, 
CRITICAL PAYMENTS 3 (2004), available at http://www.nhpf.org/library/
background-papers/BP_MedicaidDSH_09-14-04.pdf. Payments are made to 
states, which in turn distribute the funds to hospitals. CHRISTIE PROVOST 
PETERS, NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE 
HOSPITAL (DSH) PAYMENTS 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.voryshcadvisors.com/files/2012/04/Basics_DSH_06-15-09.pdf. In 
2011 these payments totaled $11.59 billion. JOHN R. JACOB ET AL., THE 
MEDICARE DSH ADJUSTMENT 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/MM12/p
apers/M_jacob_etal_slides.pdf. The Medicare DSH program, established in 
1986, paid out $10.8 Billion in 2010. See id. 
 293. See John A. Graves, Medicaid Expansion Opt-Outs and 
Uncompensated Care, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2365, 2365 (2012). The impact of 
these reductions is expected to be particularly great in states opting to forego 
Medicaid expansion in 2014. Id. 
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be specific, and the burden falls upon the government that 
incurred the debt. 
ii. What the Federal Government Cannot Count Toward 
EMTALA Debt 
This is the more interesting question. As explained above, 
the hospital’s overall fiscal health, including any budget 
surpluses via “excess” (more than FMV) payments from private 
insurers, cannot count toward EMTALA debt. Likewise the 
federal government can only count those Medicaid294 payments 
directed toward Medicaid beneficiaries’ emergency care. Per 
                                                          
 294. Lundstrom provides a useful description of Medicare and Medicaid. 
See Lundstrom, supra note 227, at 1250 n.53. 
  Both Medicare and Medicaid were created in 1965 under the Social 
Security Act of 1965. Lundstrom, supra note 227, at 1245 n.20. Medicare 
extended health coverage to almost all Americans aged sixty-five and over. 
Key Milestones in CMS Programs, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVICES, http://cms.hhs.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History/
Downloads/KeyMilestonesinCMSPrograms.zip (last updated June 13, 2013, 
11:20 AM). In 1972, amendments expanded coverage to include the disabled 
and those with end-stage renal disease. Id. Medicare is administered by the 
federal government and reimbursement rates are set by statute. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“Nothing in the provisions of, or amendments 
made by, this Act . . . shall result in a reduction of guaranteed benefits under 
[Medicare].”). 
  On the other hand, Medicaid, a program that pays for health-related 
services for certain groups of needy individuals, is a combined federal/state 
program administered by the states. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2006 & Supp. V 
2011) (authorizing an appropriation to help the States pay for medical care for 
the poor and disabled). Under this program, “each State for the most part has 
broad discretion in determining the payment methodology and payment rate 
for services.” BARBARA S. KLEES ET AL., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 




   Payments to hospitals for the Medicare program are calculated 
utilizing a complicated formula that takes into account a Base Rate per DRG, 
wage index, and geographic location (large urban or other). See Medicare 
Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems 
and Fiscal Year 2004 Rates, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,346, 45,348 (proposed Aug. 1, 
2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413); see also Medicare Program; 
Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal 
Year 2004 Rates; Correction, 68 Fed. Reg. 57,732 (Oct. 6, 2003) (to be codified 
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413) (listing corrections to previously published wage 
index information). “Since hospital rates for Medicaid are determined by the 
states with federal approval, and hospital rates for Medicare are determined 
by statute, reimbursement rates for the two programs may differ, even for the 
same patient condition or DRG.” Lundstrom, supra note 227, at 1250 n.53. 
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many hospitals’ experience, Medicaid payments are insufficient 
even to cover their intended use,295 hence are unlikely to 
generate overages applicable to EMTALA debt. 
The upshot for present purposes is simply that, if an NFP 
institution’s uncompensated EMTALA expenditures exceed its 
obligation to provide free EMTALA care, and if government 
funding properly counted toward EMTALA debt is inadequate, 
then any excess hospital costs for EMTALA patients are not 
merely a taking, they now represent a taking without just 
compensation and are unconstitutional. 
3. Public Hospitals 
Public hospitals (other than federally funded hospitals 
such as Veterans Administration facilities) are funded by state 
or local governments with the specific mission to serve 
designated state or local populations.296 EMTALA mandates 
that these institutions serve all who come to their EDs, without 
providing funds and regardless of whether the patient is a 
member of the designated service population.297 The above 
                                                          
 295. For instance, in Franklin Memorial Hospital v. Harvey, Plaintiff 
Franklin Memorial Hospital (FMH), in one of Maine’s poorest counties, 
received on average about $2645 for the care of each indigent inpatient, while 
the average expense was nearly $5000. See Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, 
575 F.3d 121, 124 (1st Cir. 2009). For 2008 the hospital gave away nearly 
$900,000 in uncompensated care. Id. 
In 2001, 57% of hospitals were paid less than what is [sic] cost them 
to care for Medicare patients. Also, according to an analysis by the 
Lewin Group, hospitals received only 84 cents in Medicaid revenue 
and tax appropriations for every dollar it cost them to care for 
Medicaid and charity patients. 
Lundstrom, supra note 227, at 1254 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). A number of authors have discussed the question of whether 
inadequate compensation constitutes an unconstitutional taking. See Lunney, 
supra note 122, at 1924–35 (providing an overview of compensation in recent 
case law); Merrill, supra note 285, at 665–66 (discussing what limits the 
constitution places on price controls on physicians). But see Brewbaker, supra 
note 122, at 702–07 (arguing that the courts will probably uphold price 
controls). 
 296. See Funding Essential Care, NAT’L ASS’N PUB. HOSPS., 
http://www.naph.org/Main-Menu-Category/Our-Work/Safety-Net-
Financing.aspx (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (“Hospitals . . . rely on payments 
from federal, state, and local governments to successfully care for low-income 
patients and preserve essential services for the entire community.”). 
 297. EMTALA, AM. C. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, http://www.acep.org/
content.aspx?id=25936 (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (“[EMTALA] is a federal 
law that requires anyone coming to an emergency department to be stabilized 
and treated, regardless of their insurance status or ability to pay . . . . 
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arguments regarding NFP hospitals apply equally well to 
public hospitals. The federal government cannot properly count 
others’ payments toward its own debts. 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the federal 
government generally cannot commandeer states to do its 
business.298 As the Court underscored in NFIB, the 
Constitution’s Spending Clause permits Congress to condition 
its grants to states “to secure compliance with federal 
objectives.”299 However, to preserve the Constitution’s two-
government system, the Court will “strike down federal 
legislation that commandeers a State’s legislative or 
administrative apparatus for federal purposes.”300 Arguably 
EMTALA, applied to state or locally-funded public hospitals, 
oversteps its bounds if it usurps those public hospitals to serve 
federal rather than state goals. 
The specifics of whether this-or-that particular dollar of 
funding will count toward an EMTALA debt are left to be 
debated elsewhere. The important point for present purposes is 
that wherever an indigent EMTALA patient’s care is not paid 
for by the patient or by the federal government, the taking is left 
uncompensated, and hence is unconstitutional. 
                                                          
[Medicare-participating hospitals must] treat the emergency medical 
conditions of patients in a non-discriminatory manner to anyone . . . .”). 
 298. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that the 
federal government cannot commandeer a states’ resources to implement the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act). “The Framers’ experience under the 
Articles of Confederation had persuaded them that using the States as the 
instruments of federal governance was both ineffectual and provocative of 
federal-state conflict . . . . [T]he Framers rejected the concept of a central 
government that would act upon and through the States . . . .” Id. at 919. 
The great innovation of this design was that “our citizens would have 
two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from 
incursion by the other”—“a legal system unprecedented in form and 
design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own 
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and 
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.” 
Id. at 920 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 299. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 
(2012). 
 300. Id. (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 933). In addition, the Court made clear 
that if the Federal Government’s mandate leaves a state with no real choice, 
then “the Federal Government can achieve its objectives without 
accountability . . . . [T]his danger is heightened when Congress acts under the 
Spending Clause, because Congress can use that power to implement federal 
policy it could not impose directly under its enumerated powers.” Id. at 2603. 
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VI. CONFUSED JURISPRUDENCE 
As noted in Part I, the U.S. Supreme Court has never 
addressed the constitutionality of EMTALA, nor have any 
circuit courts. A few courts have addressed somewhat 
comparable issues arising from state mandates to serve 
indigent patients.301 In some of these cases the state pays for 
the care, but the hospital alleges the amount is inadequate.302 
Other cases feature no payment at all and allege an 
unconstitutional taking on that basis.303 The latter are 
spotlighted here, as courts’ errors in addressing these cases are 
particularly instructive. 
As this Part will show, the pivotal error these courts make 
is to assume that when a government requires a hospital to 
provide uncompensated care to indigent patients, it is an 
instance of land use regulation in which the government 
regulates the hospital-as-a-whole. Courts then invoke Penn 
Central’s three factors to discern whether the regulation 
impairs the value of the hospital-as-a-whole, or harms its 
overall financial viability.304 
This entire framework is mistaken. The hospital is not the 
property. The hospital is the (corporate) “person” whose 
property is being taken. The Supreme Court has no difficulty 
recognizing that takings can be imposed upon corporate 
                                                          
 301. See Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 129 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(ruling that Maine’s “free care” laws did not constitute a taking); St. Joseph’s 
Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Maricopa Cnty., 786 P.2d 983, 986, 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1989) (holding that the state has the authority to determine what qualifies as 
“indigent,” and such qualifications, even when coupled with the obligations 
imposed on the hospital to treat all emergency patients, does not constitute a 
taking). 
 302. See Franklin Mem’l Hosp., 575 F.3d at 124 (“FMH recovers some of 
the costs it incurs in treating certain low income patients through 
reimbursements from the MaineCare program. Yet reimbursements through 
MaineCare fall well short of FMH’s actual costs in treating patients.”). 
 303. See id. at 124 (“Maine provides no payment for the medical services 
rendered in compliance with its free care laws . . . .”). 
 304. As the reader will recall, the Penn Central factors are: [1] the 
regulation’s economic impact on the claimant; [2] “the extent to which it has 
interfered with investment-backed expectations;” and [3] the character of the 
government action, particularly whether it features a physical invasion. Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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persons just as upon individual human beings.305 EMTALA 
imposes precisely this sort of taking. 
The leading example is Franklin Memorial Hospital v. 
Harvey.306 Although the First Circuit did address the alleged 
inadequacy of Maine’s reimbursements under its Medicaid 
MaineCare program,307 it primarily focused on Maine’s 
separate statute requiring all hospitals in the state to provide 
free medical care to the indigent, regardless of eligibility for 
MaineCare.308 The latter statute commonly resulted in no 
payment whatsoever to the hospital.309 
Similarly, in St. Joseph’s Hospital & Medical Center v. 
Maricopa County,310 the county mandated that hospitals care 
for the indigent, yet defined its own payment responsibilities so 
narrowly that hospitals were forced to treat many people gratis 
who clearly could not pay for their care.311 The Court of 
Appeals of Arizona held that the county is authorized to 
determine who is eligible for assistance.312 Therefore, although 
the hospital could bill the patient, it could not collect from the 
county.313 
                                                          
 305. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) 
(finding to the extent that a company has a trade-secret property right, such 
right is protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 306. Franklin Mem’l Hosp., 575 F.3d at 121. 
 307. See id. at 129–30. 
 308. See id. at 125–29. MaineCare is Maine’s version of Medicaid. 
 309. Id. at 129 (“Maine’s free care laws merely require that hospitals not 
refuse to treat patients based on their ability to pay and that they provide 
those services freely to those with incomes at or below 150% of the federal 
poverty level.”); see Jessica Hall, Maine Hospitals’ Free Care Doubled, 
MORNING SENTINEL, May 7, 2012, http://www.onlinesentinel.com/news/maine-
hospitals-free-care-doubled_2012-05-06.html?pagenum=full (discussing the 
difficulties facing hospitals when dealing with the extra costs and that 
“charity care” under the statute doubled from 2006 to 2011). 
 310. St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Maricopa Cnty., 786 P.2d 983 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1989). 
 311. See id. at 984. In the instant case, the county determined that the 
patient was not indigent because his spouse had enough money to overcome 
the “indigent” classification. Id. At the same time, all parties agreed that 
when the bill came due, the hospital would not be allowed to go after the 
spouse’s assets. Id. at 985. Thus, the very same separate spousal assets that 
rendered the otherwise-indigent patient unqualified for financial assistance 
were expressly off limits for collection purposes. See id. at 985–86. 
 312. See id. at 986 (“[T]he legislature may and must draw financial 
eligibility lines somewhere.”). 
 313. Id. at 989–89. See Bay General Community Hospital v. County of San 
Diego, 203 Cal. Rptr. 184, 185–95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), where a somewhat 
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Both these courts presumed they were addressing a case of 
land use regulation, then assumed that the property in 
question was the hospital-as-a-whole and invoked Penn 
Central’s three-factor regulatory takings analysis.314 Although 
both hospitals argued that personal property such as “services, 
facilities, and supplies” was taken,315 both courts focused solely 
on realty. Per the Arizona appellate court: 
Traditional eminent domain cases shed some light on the question. 
The typical eminent domain case involves the taking or regulation of 
real property which diminishes or destroys the value of that 
property to the owner and provides a direct benefit to the state . . . . 
[T]he eminent domain analysis provided in property-use-regulation 
cases will be our guide.316 
The Arizona Court initially determined that a per se 
taking did not occur, since the county’s actions were not 
“tantamount to a complete condemnation of the hospital,”317 or 
                                                          
similar Catch-22 situation emerged in California. A state appellate court left 
in place a complex situation in which a private hospital was required to 
provide emergency care to indigent residents and non-resident patients, even 
though: [a] payment for hospital care was only made to one county-approved 
hospital (i.e., University Hospital), id. at 187; [b] the private hospital was not 
allowed to transfer this patient to University Hospital, id. at 190–92; and [c] 
in any event, no compensation would be available for the treatment of 
undocumented aliens, even though the hospital was required to provide the 
emergency care. Id. at 193–94. 
 314. The regulatory takings analysis generally applies to real property but 
has occasionally been used outside of real property. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. 
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 529–37 (1998) (plurality opinion) (applying regulatory 
takings analysis to pension plan obligations). 
 315. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 786 P.2d at 987; Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, 
575 F.3d 121, 126 (1st Cir. 2009) (“FMH stresses that Maine’s free care laws 
require it to give away its personal property to the extent that it must 
purchase and freely provide expensive medicines and medical supplies to low 
income patients.”). 
 316. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 786 P.2d at 987. The Court noted that: 
This case is atypical because the benefit—emergency health care—
inures to the patient directly. The only fiscal benefit the state enjoys 
is that it does not have to pay for the patient’s care, unless the patient 
qualifies as indigent. There is some authority for the proposition that 
the government must pay for an unconstitutional taking of property, 
even if it is another who derives the benefit. 
Id. (citing Ivey v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Tenn. 1950)). As 
discussed above, this patient was in fact indigent even though he did not 
qualify as such because of spousal assets that, themselves, were statutorily 
unavailable to the hospital. As a result the hospital was required to shoulder 
the burden for his care. See supra note 311. 
 317. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 786 P.2d at 988. 
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a denial of all “economically viable use of the land.”318 The 
Court then delved into the first two Penn Central criteria, 
namely economic impact and investment-backed expectations, 
finding that “these ‘bad debts’ are absorbed by the hospital as a 
cost of doing business that is ultimately passed on to the 
consumer.”319 Per Penn Central’s third factor, the character of 
the government action, the Court found that this was not a 
“physical invasion by government,”320 but rather was simply a 
requirement, as a condition of doing business in the state, that 
the hospital ask the patient to pay if he or she does not qualify 
as indigent321—the so-called “voluntariness argument” 
discarded above.322 
Franklin Memorial primarily focused on Maine’s mandate 
that hospitals serve low income patients for no payment at 
all.323 The law is enforced by a system of fines and lawsuits,324 
                                                          
 318. Id. at 987 (quoting Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 730 P.2d 528, 535 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)); see id. at 988 (relying on the fact that St. Joseph’s failed 
to provide sufficient information to determine the economic hardship resulting 
from the hospital’s uncompensated care obligations). 
 319. Id. at 988. 
 320. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 
124 (1978)). 
 321. Id. at 988; see also In re Health Care Admin. Bd. v. Finley, 415 A.2d 
1147, 1154 (N.J. 1980) (“Restrictions on the use of property, if in furtherance 
of a valid governmental purpose, serve the public interest and are considered 
a proper exercise of the police power even though they may result in some 
economic disadvantage. Local rent control is a prime example of such police 
power regulation.”). 
 322. See supra Part V.A. The reader will recall that the “Voluntariness 
Argument” cannot survive since (1) the opportunity to earn is not actual 
compensation; (2) congressional imposition of financial burdens on hospitals in 
1986 hardly make the choice to join the program “voluntary;” and (3) such 
coercion is bad health policy since it is causing hospitals to stop offering 
emergency care services. 
 323. See Franklin Mem’l Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 125–29 (1st Cir. 
2009). 
 324. Id. at 123–24 (“[T]he state obtains compliance with its free care 
requirement through a system of fines and enforcement suits brought by the 
state’s attorney general or any affected patient.”). The Court also noted that 
Rhode Island has a similar statute. Id. at 124 n.2; see also Gayland Oliver 
Hethcoat II, Note, Free Hospital Care and the Takings Clause: Franklin 
Memorial Hospital v. Harvey in a Changing Health-Care Landscape, 65 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 169, 179–80 (2010) (discussing the applicable Maine statute, 
which states that “[n]o hospital shall deny services to any Maine resident 
solely because of the inability of the individual to pay for those services,” and 
defines “services” as “all medically necessary inpatient and outpatient 
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permitting exception only for cases where the obligation causes 
financially ruinous consequences.325 The First Circuit rejected 
the hospital’s argument that this statute represented an 
unconstitutional taking.326 Presuming the property to be the 
hospital-as-a-whole, the court undertook a regulatory 
analysis,327 invoked the three Penn Central factors,328 and 
found none sufficient for a taking.329 First, indigent care did not 
consume an inordinately high proportion of the hospital’s gross 
revenues,330 and the statute permitted hospitals to stop 
providing free care if their economic viability were 
jeopardized.331 Second, although NFP hospitals can have 
“investment-backed expectations,” the hospital knew quite well 
that it was in a highly regulated industry, and hence must 
expect and plan for the fact that financial burdens of this sort 
might be imposed.332 Finally, the First Circuit held that this 
was not a physical invasion, but rather was simply a public 
                                                          
services” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 10-144-150 ME. 
CODE R. §§ 1.01(A), 1.03 (LexisNexis 2007))). 
 325. Franklin Mem’l Hosp., 575 F.3d at 124. Specifically, the statute 
permits hospitals to avoid liability if “economic viability would be jeopardized 
by compliance.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §1715(2)(D) (2013). 
 326. Id. at 129. 
 327. Id. at 125 (“Here, the challenged government action, which does not 
directly appropriate FMH’s property but rather regulates how FMH may use 
it, is properly analyzed under the law of regulatory takings, not the law of 
physical takings.”). As the court noted, “[a] physical taking occurs either when 
there is a condemnation or a physical appropriation of property,” whereas “[a] 
regulatory taking transpires when some significant restriction is placed upon 
an owner’s use of his property for which ‘justice and fairness’ require that 
compensation be given.” Id. (quoting Phillip Morris Inc., v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 
33 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc)). 
  En passant the court acknowledged the two kinds of per se taking: a 
permanent physical invasion of the property, and deprivation of all 
economically beneficial use of the property. Id. at 125–26. However, the court 
opined that neither of these applied in the instant case. Id. at 126. First, if a 
hospital does not wish to serve indigent patients it is free to use its property in 
some other way instead of as a hospital (the familiar voluntariness argument). 
Id. at 126. Second, there was no allegation that this hospital had somehow lost 
all economic value—as a hospital—by being forced to provide some free care. 
See id. Hence, said the court, there was no per se taking here. Id. 
 328. They are: economic impact, investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the government’s invasion. Id. at 126. 
 329. See, e.g., Franklin Mem’l Hosp., 575 F.3d at 129. 
 330. Id. at 124. 
 331. Id. at 127. 
 332. See id. at 128 (“FMH’s investment-backed expectations are tempered 
by the fact that it operates in a highly regulated hospital industry.”). 
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program that “adjust[s] the benefits and burdens of economic 
life to promote the common good.”333 
By now it should be clear that these analyses completely 
misunderstand the Takings Clause. Although Franklin 
Memorial Hospital expressly argued that it was required to 
“give away its personal property,”334 and that it “must purchase 
and freely provide expensive medicines and medical supplies to 
low income patients,”335 the court responded that the hospital 
had the option to stop being a hospital.336 Such a non sequitur 
is puzzling at best. If the state commandeers my car, how does 
it help that I am still free to use my garage for something other 
than sheltering a car? They still took my car. At no point does 
the First Circuit take seriously the possibility that some of the 
alleged takings were of costly personal property. 
And yet, that is precisely what happens in EMTALA cases. 
As argued above, EMTALA does not take (or regulate) bricks, 
mortar, and dirt—the real estate. Rather, it mandates per se 
takings: complete destruction of personal property such as 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and physical occupation 
of hospital spaces (ER, OR, ICU, inpatient beds). The Supreme 
                                                          
 333. Id. at 128–29 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
 334. Id. at 126. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. (“FMH is not required to serve low income patients; it may choose 
to stop using its property as a hospital, which makes it subject to Maine’s free 
care laws.”). The court compared the hospital’s option to that of the owner of a 
mobile home park in Yee v. City of Escondido, who had the option to stop 
renting land to mobile homes if he did not like the rent control to which his 
property was subjected. Id. at 126 (citing Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 
519, 527–28 (1992)); see Gary E. Jones, Regulatory Takings and Emergency 
Medical Treatment, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 145, 178 (2010) (discussing the 
Franklin Memorial trial court and appellate court decisions). The trial court 
evinced an apparently greater grasp of the issue as it deemed the personal 
property to be an “investment” that the hospital made, but that such an 
investment had to have been made in the “expectation” that the hospital 
would be obliged to provide a significant amount of free care. Franklin Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Harvey, No. 07-125-B-S, 2008 WL 4416412, at *4 (D. Me. Sept. 24, 
2008). Thus, the trial court discussed the personal property issue in the 
context of Penn Central’s “investment-backed expectations.” See id. at *4–9. 
The trial court’s analysis suffers from the same flaw as the other analyses: it 
presumes that this is about real estate, and that the proper analytic 
framework is as a regulatory taking. This, as discussed herein, is simply a 
misconstruction of the issue. 
2014] DUMPING THE "ANTI-DUMPING" LAW 277 
 
Court does not require that the entire property be invaded,337 
nor that invaders be physically present at every moment of 
every day.338 Like other cases of eminent domain discussed 
here, the ever-present prospect of high-cost indigent emergency 
patients imposes a servitude or easement on the hospital, an 
“intermittent flood”339 of EMTALA patients. 
Borrowing the Supreme Court’s own words in Brown v. 
Washington Legal Foundation, the whole EMTALA process 
resembles a “Robin Hood Taking”: 
Perhaps we are witnessing today the emergence of a whole new 
concept in Compensation Clause jurisprudence: the Robin Hood 
Taking, in which the government’s extraction of wealth from those 
who own it is so cleverly achieved, and the object of the 
government’s larcenous beneficence is so highly favored by the 
courts (taking from the rich to give to indigent defendants) that the 
normal rules of the Constitution protecting private property are 
suspended. One must hope that that is the case. For to extend to the 
entire run of Compensation Clause cases the rationale supporting 
today’s judgment—what the government hath given, the 
government may freely take away—would be disastrous.340 
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: AN OMINOUS 
PREDICTION . . . AND A TWIST 
We turn now to policy implications and a story of two 
statutes on a collision course. 
A. EMTALA THE FIG LEAF 
Over the years, the first statute, EMTALA, has become a 
“fig leaf” of sorts. As we rushed to help the poor soul who lies 
crushed and bleeding before our very eyes, it became easier to 
                                                          
 337. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Cable Television Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 438 (1982) (holding that the placement of cable boxes, wires, and bolts on 
part of the roof of a building constituted a physical invasion). 
 338. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987) (holding 
that the condition imposed on the approval of a rebuilding permit, which 
required owners to provide access for the public to pass over their land, 
constituted a physical invasion); see also Jones, supra note 336, at 179–80 
(citing the Nollan case as holding that “mandated public access on a continued 
basis constitutes a physical occupation even if no one person has a right to 
remain on the premises”). 
 339. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 
(2012) (holding that there can be a taking for a temporary but substantial 
invasion). 
 340. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 252 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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lose sight of the many ill-but-uninsured people whose names 
we never learned because they never appeared in emergency 
rooms. We have helped “identified lives” much more readily 
than “statistical lives,” even though the latter are far more 
numerous.341 We have consoled ourselves in the knowledge 
that, even if someone could not go to a doctor, he could always 
go to the ER. 
B. EMTALA THE ENABLER 
Nearly a quarter-century after EMTALA the second 
statute was born. On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama 
signed the ACA into law.342 The law attempts to ensure near-
universal health care coverage for citizens and legal 
residents.343 After constitutional challenges in four circuit 
courts,344 the U.S. Supreme Court largely upheld the ACA in 
June 2012, in NFIB.345 
To render health insurance more affordable the ACA 
requires each state to have an “insurance exchange”346 that can 
marshal the buying power traditionally enjoyed by large 
businesses.347 Individuals and small business employees will be 
able to choose from a variety of options in that marketplace.348 
Subsidies will be provided, on a sliding scale, to anyone 
between 100%–400% of the FPL.349 All health plans in the 
                                                          
 341. The distinction between identified and statistical lives is discussed, 
for example, in Randall F. Moore, Caring for Identified Versus Statistical 
Lives: An Evolutionary View of Medical Distributive Justice, 17 ETHOLOGY & 
SOCIOBIOLOGY 379, 380–92 (1996). 
 342. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
 343. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18032(a) (Supp. V. 2011). 
 344. These were the Fourth, Sixth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. See Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580–81 (2012). 
 345. The only portion the Court struck down was a provision requiring 
states to expand Medicaid coverage to cover all citizens up to 133% of the FPL. 
Id. at 2601–07. This portion was found to exceed Congress’ powers under the 
Spending Clause as applied to 42 U.S.C. § 1396c of the Medicaid Act. See id. at 
2601–27. 
 346. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (Supp. V 2011). If the state does not comply, 42 
U.S.C. § 18041(c) requires that the federal government set up and operate the 
exchange in that state. 
 347. Cf. Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed 
Competition, 12 HEALTH AFF. (Supp. 1) 24, 25 (1993). 
 348. Selections are to be assisted by “navigators.” See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(i). 
 349. 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (Supp. V 2011); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2673. 
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exchange must cover “essential health benefits.”350 To ensure 
that plans are affordable even for those with preexisting 
conditions, the law requires both “guaranteed issue,” forbidding 
insurers to deny coverage to persons with preexisting 
conditions,351 and “community rating,” precluding insurers 
from charging higher rates for these persons.352 
These requirements on insurers could encourage healthy 
people to wait until they are ill or injured to buy insurance, 
thereby creating the classic economic problems of adverse 
selection. Accordingly, a third provision is an “individual 
mandate” requiring citizens and legal aliens to maintain 
minimum essential health insurance coverage.353 Anyone who 
declines to purchase insurance must pay a “shared 
responsibility payment”354 to the IRS, which “shall be assessed 
and collected in the same manner” as tax penalties.355 Although 
the Supreme Court held that the Mandate could not be 
sustained under the Commerce Clause,356 it was upheld under 
the Taxing and Spending Clause.357 
And now the two statutes begin to clash. On one hand, the 
mandate’s penalty for noncompliance was upheld as a tax 
partly because, since it is considerably less costly than 
insurance, it could legitimately be dubbed a tax and not really 
a penalty.358 However, this very price difference can encourage 
healthy people to pay the tax rather than spend considerably 
more for insurance.359 Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office 
and the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that some six 
million Americans—50% more than initially anticipated—will 
                                                          
 350. 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (Supp. V 2011). 
 351. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2613 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg–1, 300gg–3, 
300gg–4(a) (2006)). 
 352. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 353. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). 
 354. Id. § 5000A(b)(1). 
 355. Id. § 5000A(g)(1). 
 356. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585–91. 
 357. Id. at 2594–600. 
 358. Id. at 2595–96 (citation omitted) (“[F]or most Americans the amount 
due will be far less than the price of insurance, and, by statute, it can never be 
more. It may often be a reasonable financial decision to make the payment 
rather than purchase insurance, unlike the ‘prohibitory’ financial punishment 
in Drexel Furniture.”). 
 359. See id. at 2595–96. 
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opt to pay rather than play.360 This number could rise further. 
Smokers—currently about 20% of the adult population—can be 
charged up to 50% percent higher premiums, for instance, and 
age likewise can raise premiums.361 Hence for a 55-year old 
smoker, the uptick in insurance premiums could reach over 
$4000 per year.362 
Moreover, a failure to pay the penalty-tax will not be 
treated as a crime, but rather will simply trigger a letter from 
the IRS stating that money is owed.363 The IRS is not permitted 
to place liens or levies on property to collect the tax.364 The 
Mandate is thus only minimally enforceable. Accordingly, the 
number of people choosing not to buy insurance could rise far 
beyond current estimates as the law is implemented.365 
                                                          
 360. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING 
UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-19-12-
Indiv_Mandate_Penalty.pdf; see also Russ Britt, Six Million Will Pay Health 
Law Penalty: Study, MARKET WATCH (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/six-million-will-pay-health-law-penalty-
study-2012-09-19?link=MW_latest_news (“Six million Americans . . . will end 
up paying a penalty for failing to have health insurance . . . .”); Paige Winfield 
Cunningham, CBO Raises Estimate of Those Hit by Obama Health Care Tax, 
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/
sep/19/cbo-raises-estimate-those-hit-obama-health-care-ta/ (“[S]ix million 
Americans . . . are expected to pay a tax penalty . . . .”). 
 361. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Smokers May Not Be Able to Afford 
Obamacare, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 25, 2013, http://seattletimes.com/html/
health/2020208512_healthcaresmokersxml.html. 
 362. Id. 
 363. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(2)(A) (2012). 
 364. Id. § 5000A(g) (instructing the Secretary on the tools he may use to 
collect the penalty); id. § 5000A(g)(2)(B) (prohibiting the Secretary from using 
notices of lien and levies); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2584; see also 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5000A(g)(2)(A) (barring criminal prosecutions). At most, the IRS can extract 
the penalty-tax from whatever tax refund is due the taxpayer, and the right to 
collect a given sum can extend over 10 years’ refunds. See Lisa Scherzer, The 
Obamacare Penalty: Yes, It Can Be Avoided, YAHOO FINANCE (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/does-the-obamacare-penalty-actually-have-
teeth—144740030.html. However, a taxpayer could in principle avoid much of 
the penalty-tax by adjusting the amount withheld each year so that she 
receives little or no refund at the end of the year. 
 365. See Philip Klein, Higher Health Care Premiums Could Cause 
Obamacare to Death Spiral, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/higher-health-care-premiums-could-cause-
obamacare-to-death-spiral/article/2517939#.UPC-5o5BoeF (predicting a “death 
spiral”). 
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Beyond this, many of those whose incomes are just a little 
too high to receive a government subsidy may be unable to 
afford coverage. Although employers with more than fifty 
employees must offer affordable coverage,366 the ACA defines 
“affordable” as costing no more than 9.5% of income.367 For 
someone earning $21,000 per year, that figure could mean 
premiums of almost $2000, not counting whatever else would 
be owed, for example, in a high annual deductible.368 It would 
not be surprising to find many such lower-income workers 
opting to forego health insurance in favor of other household 
expenses. Add next: undocumented immigrants, persons whose 
income is below the FPL in states that declined to expand 
Medicaid, and who thus are too poor to qualify for the 
insurance exchanges; and those who, though previously 
insured, can no longer afford suddenly costlier health plans 
that now include “essential health benefits.”369 
The temptation for relatively healthy people to forego 
health insurance grows because, after all, EMTALA assures 
emergency care and, per the ACA, someone who then discovers 
ongoing healthcare needs can buy insurance, with at most a 
ninety-day waiting period for full coverage.370 In essence, one 
can wait until the house is on fire before buying homeowner’s 
insurance. 
If enough healthy people refrain from buying it, insurance 
is likely to become significantly more costly. Indeed, as Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out in her opinion: 
In the 1990’s, several States—including New York, New Jersey, 
Washington, Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont—
enacted guaranteed-issue and community-rating laws without 
requiring universal acquisition of insurance coverage. The results 
were disastrous. “All seven states suffered from skyrocketing 
                                                          
 366. See 42 U.S.C. § 18024(b) (Supp. V 2011).  
 367. Robb Mandelbaum, It’s the Affordable Care Act. But What Is 
Affordable?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/its-the-affordable-care-act-but-what-
is-affordable/?_r=0. 
 368. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Obamacare Glitch Could Make Coverage 
Unaffordable For Low-Wage Workers, HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/13/obamacare-glitch-
unaffordable_n_3435735.html?utm_hp_ref=business&ir=Business. 
 369. See supra Part II.B. 
 370. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–7 (Supp. V 2011). 
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insurance premium costs, reductions in individuals with coverage, 
and reductions in insurance products and providers.”371 
If insurance costs thus rise, small businesses currently 
providing health coverage may decide instead to pay a penalty 
and send their workers to the Insurance Exchanges.372 At that 
point workers who were previously insured will have the choice 
whether to buy insurance or to pay the penalty-tax. If a 
significant number of these people, too, forego insurance, the 
result will further erode the risk-shifting that is essential to a 
successful insurance market, and likely cause additional 
increases in the cost of health insurance. 
The result could be a financial crisis threatening the 
viability of the ACA. In the process, EMTALA would stand as a 
key enabler by shielding millions of people from the immediate 
consequences of a decision to forego insurance. Although some 
people will be genuinely unable to afford insurance even with a 
subsidy, many others will forego it as a calculated risk-benefit 
decision. That decision is made easier by EMTALA’s guarantee 
that emergency needs will be met, regardless of ability to pay. 
Indeed, during the 2012 presidential election campaign, 
republican candidate Governor Mitt Romney’s criticism of the 
ACA emphasized that even the uninsured can count on 
                                                          
 371. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2614 
(2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Brief for 
American Association of People with Disabilities et al. as Amici Curiae at 9, 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11–398)); see 
also Brief for Governor of Washington Christine Gregoire as Amicus Curiae at 
11–14, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11–
398) (discussing what happened in Washington when it had an individual 
insurance market). 
 372. NFIB., 132 S. Ct. at 2674 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & 
Alito, JJ., dissenting): 
The employer responsibility assessment provides an incentive for 
employers with at least 50 employees to provide their employees with 
health insurance options that meet minimum criteria . . . . Unlike the 
Individual Mandate, the employer-responsibility assessment does not 
require employers to provide an insurance option. Instead, it requires 
them to make a payment to the Federal Government if they do not 
offer insurance to employees and if insurance is bought on an 
exchange by an employee who qualifies for the exchange’s federal 
subsidies. 
Id. (citation omitted). See also Stacy Cowley, Dropping Health Plans, to Pick 
Better Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
12/12/business/smallbusiness/changing-the-health-insurance-equation-for-
small-employers.html?gwh=5CCEBFA6D882A54BD0D1BAF0458A3152. 
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emergency care as a safety net.373 His remark echoed former 
President George W. Bush’s statement that “people have access 
to health care in America. After all, you just go to an 
emergency room.”374 
C. THE TWIST: EMINENT DOMAIN TO REVITALIZE THE MANDATE 
In closing, there is a twist. We cannot expect a health care 
system based on private insurance to survive if citizens are 
permitted to wait until the house is on fire to buy their home 
insurance, and then buy it for the same price as everyone else. 
At some point, if the ACA is to survive, the Mandate needs real 
teeth.375 This statement is not intended to endorse either the 
Mandate or the ACA, but simply to trace out the direct 
financial implications of the foregoing financial scenario and to 
identify an avenue that could, logically, meet the challenge. 
So here is the twist. If Congress so chose,376 the insurance 
mandate could be implemented, not as an easily avoidable 
“tax,”377 but as a bona fide act of eminent domain. That is, the 
very same Fifth Amendment principles discussed above could 
be used, in a very different direction, to make sure that 
everyone is insured. A detailed explication is reserved for 
another occasion, but the basics are these: 
                                                          
 373. See Andis Robeznieks, Groups Criticize Romney Over Comment on 
Care for Uninsured, MOD. HEALTH CARE (Sept. 24, 2012), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20120924/NEWS/309249951/groups-
criticize-romney-over-comment-on-care-for-uninsured; Elise Viebeck, Romney: 
Uninsured Can Seek Care in ER, THE HILL (Sept. 24, 2012, 12:07 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/politics-elections/251249-romney-
uninsured-can-seek-care-in-the-er; cf. Jeffrey Young, Mississippi’s GOP 
Governor Says No American Lacks Health Care, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-young/phil-bryant-health-care-
r_b_2534962.html (discussing a similar comment by Mississippi Governor 
Bryant). 
 374. Remarks to the Greater Cleveland Partnership and a Question-and-
Answer Session in Cleveland, Ohio, 2007 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 920, 922 
(July 10, 2007). 
 375. This Article offers no opinion regarding whether it would be good, or 
not good, to preserve the ACA. Rather, the point is simply that Community 
Rating plus Guaranteed Issue are financially unsustainable in the absence of 
some sort of mandate ensuring that enough people will buy insurance to 
spread risk adequately. 
 376. Such a choice is admittedly quite unlikely, but the exercise has 
interest, given the potential financial challenges if insurance costs spiral 
upward as described. 
 377. See supra notes 363–65 and accompanying discussion. 
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(1) The public use: preserving the viability of a health care 
system financed by individual insurance policies; 
(2) The property to be taken: the individual person’s 
money;378 
(3) The just compensation: a health plan for that 
individual—one that includes all the essential health benefits 
required by the ACA.379 
Of particular interest, this approach to the ACA’s mandate, 
unlike the current version, would not have to pass muster 
under either the Commerce Clause380 or the Taxing and 
Spending Clause.381 
As recently as 2005 the Supreme Court re-emphasized 
that, when it comes to government exercises of eminent 
domain, the courts will be highly deferential under a rational 
basis review.382 In Kelo v. City of New London383 the Court was 
asked to determine whether a legislatively mandated transfer 
of land from one private party to another comported with the 
Constitution’s requirement that a taking be for public use.384 
                                                          
 378. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 220, 240 (2003); 
Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998); Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980). These cases show us 
that money has long been deemed a type of property for purposes of the 
Takings Clause. Here, the amount of money would be determined, per the 
ACA, according to the person’s wealth, with sliding-scale assistance for those 
between “100 and 400 percent” of the FPL. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2673 (2012). 
 379. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (Supp. V 2011). Although it would be somewhat 
unusual to provide something other than money as compensation under the 
Takings Clause, nothing prevents the use of a monetary equivalent such as a 
health plan to serve as the compensation afforded to the individual from 
whom property has been taken. The only requirement is that it be “just” under 
the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, in a strong sense the compensation is still 
monetary, albeit with strings: the citizen whose money has been taken would 
be given, in essence, a monetary-equivalent voucher that can be “spent,” albeit 
only in one marketplace, namely the health insurance market as the person 
chooses from available health plans. See id. §18022(d) (identifying the ACA’s 
tiered levels of coverage). 
 380. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 381. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2594–600 (holding that 
the ACA’s “mandate” to purchase health insurance was not constitutionally 
sustainable under the Commerce Clause, but that the “penalty” for failing to 
buy insurance could be upheld as a tax). 
 382. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 383. Id. at 469. 
 384. Id. at 472. 
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“Without exception, our cases have defined that concept 
broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to 
legislative judgments in this field.”385 The Court’s scope of 
review for eminent domain is thus limited.386 “When the 
legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are not 
irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the 
wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of 
other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried 
out in the federal courts.”387 This deference extends to 
Congress.388 
In the final analysis, several competing factors must 
somehow be reconciled. Surely those who are emergently ill or 
injured should receive care, without delaying for financial 
                                                          
 385. Id. at 480. The Court went on to cite Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 
(1954), Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), and other 
cases affirming judicial deference to legislative decisions. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 
480–82. 
 386. Id. at 484. 
 387. Id. at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Haw. Hous. 
Auth., 467 U.S. at 242–43). The Court also wrote: 
Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence has recognized that the needs of 
society have varied between different parts of the Nation, just as they 
have evolved over time in response to changed circumstances. Our 
earliest cases in particular embodied a strong theme of federalism, 
emphasizing the “great respect” that we owe to state legislatures and 
state courts in discerning local public needs. 
Id. at 482. Prior decisions were equally clear: 
This Court has declared that a taking should be upheld as consistent 
with the Public Use Clause, U.S. Const., Amdt. 5, as long as it is 
“rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.” . . . This 
deferential standard of review echoes the rational-basis test used to 
review economic regulation under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses . . . . 
Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).  
 388. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984) (“So long 
as the taking has a conceivable public character, ‘the means by which it will be 
attained is . . . for Congress to determine.’” (alteration in original) (internal 
citation omitted)). 
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has 
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh 
conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main 
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, 
whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of 
Columbia . . . or the States legislating concerning local affairs . . . . 
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to 
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the 
power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954) (citations omitted). 
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questions that should be addressed later.389 At the same time, 
the Constitution forbids this public burden to be foisted on a 
limited number of private parties.”390 
The remedy is not at all clear, nor does this Article purport 
to show the way. Suffice it to say, if somehow we succeed in 
broadening insured access to care for a much larger proportion 
of our citizens, it will follow that far fewer instances of 
EMTALA care will be uncompensated and thereby 
unconstitutional. The Catch-22 challenge is that EMTALA 
may, itself, obstruct that path by continuing to encourage 
people to avoid becoming insured. 
Stay tuned . . . the conversation is likely to become quite 
interesting. 
                                                          
 389. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 390. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
